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Lost in the Shuffle: State-Recognized
Tribes and the Tribal Gaming Industry
By ALExA KOENIG* AND JONATHAN STEIN**
"Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law . .. is the principle
that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in
general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inher-
ent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished ....
What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty."
-Felix S. Cohen1
FEDERAL RECOGNITION of Native American tribes, and the rights
that attend such recognition, has rarely been the subject of such wide-
spread interest as it is today. Tribes are redefining their place in soci-
ety based on the influx of money and power that has come with tribal
gaming-a right currently afforded only to federally-recognized
tribes. In just fifteen years, between 1988 and 2003, the tribal gaming
industry has grown from $100 million to more than $15 billion.2 Ac-
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1. FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122 (Univ.
of N. M. Press 1971) (1942) [hereinafter COHEN'S 1971 HANDBOOK].
2. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The Indian
Gaming Working Group, Protecting Indian Country from Crime (June 30, 2004), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressre104/063004indiangaming.htm.
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cording to one recent report, tribal gaming generated a staggering
$18.5 billion in 2004 alone.3 But what gaming rights may be afforded
to, and exercised by, state-recognized tribes? 4
There is a subset of America's tribal population whose rights have
been largely overlooked. This subset consists of Indian tribes that have
been subjugated but never officially recognized by the federal govern-
ment. Their continued existence has been so obvious, however, that
the states where they reside have officially recognized them as sover-
eign governments that continue to this day.
This category of Native America's organized political tribal
groups, called "state-recognized tribes," occupies an even less under-
stood legal status than its federally-recognized counterpart. Today,
thirteen states-Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia 5-recognize Indian tribes not acknowl-
edged by the federal government. State-recognized tribes face an in-
consistent and uncertain scope of state powers that varies dramatically
between states.
In this Article, we argue that state-recognized tribes, like those
with formal federal recognition, have a legal right to engage in gam-
ing under state law. We also profile two state-recognized tribes-the
Gabrielino-Tongva of California and the Shinnecock Indian Nation of
New York-to showcase the historical similarities between federal and
state tribes and to illustrate the inequities involved in preventing state
tribes from opening casinos of their own.
Tribe-state relations have been contentious for centuries, fueled
by a conflict over resources, such as land and other natural resources,
held by tribes but desired by the general population. Accordingly,
most federal tribal law is built on the premise that state governments
3. See NAT'L INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN
GAMING IN 2004, at 2 (2004), available at http://www.indiangaming.org/NIGA-econim-
pact_.2004.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005); see also Doug Abrahms, State's Indian Casinos Earn
$4.2 Billion, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs),July 7, 2004, at Al (reporting the findings of Alan
Meister for Analysis Group, which noted that in 2003, tribal gaming generated $4.2 billion
in California alone, and $16 billion nationwide).
4. Tribes that have achieved formal federal recognition are also recognized by the
states in which they reside, and therefore are also "state-recognized." For the sake of clarity,
however, we refer to tribes that have not received formal federal recognition as "state-
recognized" or "state tribes" and those that have achieved the additional level of federal
recognition as "federally-recognized" or "federal tribes."
5. This list was compiled through online and statutory research, as well as a series of
phone interviews with state organizations responsible for coordinating tribal interaction
with their respective state.
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and tribes oppose one another, and the federal government must pro-
tect Indians from the depredations of state governments and the gen-
eral populace. 6 Today, a new model is forming as state and tribal
governments realize the mutual economic and social benefits that can
result from tribal gaming. When states and state tribes want to work
together, federal "protection" becomes not only unnecessary, but may
hinder the very rights the federal government purportedly wishes to
protect.
The argument that state-recognized tribes should be able to game
under state law also reflects broad principles of federalism: Can the
federal government limit the rights of tribes it does not acknowledge,
especially in an area such as gaming, which has traditionally been sub-
ject to state control? Should states have the right to compact with
tribes that the state recognizes as government entities, based upon
state and tribal sovereignty alone? Beneath these themes also lie fun-
damental notions of civil and natural rights: When the system of fed-
eral recognition takes decades to complete, should non-federally-
recognized tribal governments be forced to forego much needed eco-
nomic opportunities for their members?
The history of Indian gaming is already well documented and can
be found in the sources upon which this Article builds. 7 Instead, Part I
of this Article briefly reviews the well-documented history of two state-
recognized tribes-the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe of California and the
Shinnecock Tribe of New York-to provide context for our argu-
ments. As these profiles clearly indicate, the histories of state tribes
are often no less documented or legitimate than those of their feder-
ally-recognized counterparts, even though these two tribes continue to
be denied recognition as sovereigns by the United States. Absent fed-
eral acknowledgment and the political rights acknowledgement be-
6. For example, the Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000), gave the
federal government exclusive authority over the disposition of all tribal lands, in order to
provide oversight of land transfers by Native American political groups. Congress specifi-
cally passed the Act to protect tribes from the predatory efforts of states and other entities
that took advantage of tribal poverty to extract valuable tribal lands from Indian tribes at
cheap prices. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians § 112 (1995).
7. For a general overview of the history of tribal gaming, see Kevin K. Washburn,
Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L.J. 285, 287 (2004) (explaining that
Indian gaming originated with bingo operations in California and Florida in the 1970s).
For a more detailed overview of how Indian gaming evolved in California, see, for example,
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 996-98 (Cal. 1999);
MICHAEL LOMBARDI, LONG ROAD TRAVELED III: CALIFORNIA INDIAN SELF RELIANCE AND THE
BATrLE FOR IA (2000), http://www.cniga.com/facts/History-ofCA_- GamingPart_3.pdf
(last visitedJuly 28, 2005); K. Alexa Koenig, Gambling on Proposition IA: The California Indian
Self-Reliance Initiative, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1033 (2002).
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stows, such state tribes are unnecessarily prevented from providing a
better life for their tribal members.
In Part II, we present a five-part argument in support of state tri-
bal gaming. We explain that (1) the regulation of gaming is generally
a state right, (2) state tribes are sovereign governments with the right
to game, except as preempted by the federal government, (3) federal
law does not preempt gaming by state tribes, and thus states have the
intrinsic power to enter into gaming compacts with the state tribes
they recognize, (4) state tribal gaming does not violate equal protec-
tion guarantees, much as gaming by federally-recognized tribes com-
plies with Fourteenth Amendment mandates, and (5) significant
policy arguments weigh in favor of permitting gaming by state tribes
under state law.8
I. The Histories Behind Two State-Recognized Tribes
Demonstrate the Arbitrariness of Federal Recognition
Unfortunately, many tribes with extremely well-documented his-
tories and longstanding relationships with their respective states and
the federal government remain unrecognized, despite years of effort
to gain official recognition from the United States. Many such tribes
reside in close proximity to tribes with similar histories-tribes who
have enjoyed recognition for decades. As stated by Joe Saulque, who
chaired the Advisory Council on California Indians, whether a tribe
has formal recognition today has depended in large part on "luck."9
The stories of two such tribes are detailed below, to demonstrate the
arbitrariness of the federal recognition process. 10
8. This Article does not reach or otherwise consider the parallel argument that state
tribes may conduct gaming based solely upon their limited but inherent sovereign powers.
9. See Tribal Contract Support Cost Technical Amendments of 2000: Oversight Hearing on
H.R. 946, H.R 2671, and H.R. 4148 Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 51 (2000)
(statement of Rep. Lynn C. Woolsey, Member of Cong.), available at http://commdocs.
house.gov/committees/resources/ (follow the "hii68434.000" hyperlink) (last visited Jan.
10, 2006) (concerned with making "technical amendments to the provisions of the Indian
self-determination and education assistance act relating to contract support costs, and for
other purposes," noting "luck often determined whether a tribe got recognized"); see also
Stephen Magagnini, 'Lost' Tribes: Why Must We Prove We're Indians ?, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1,
1997, at Al, available at http://www.sacbee.com/static/archive/news/projects/native/
day3_main.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
10. See infra Part II.E.2 for an overview of the federal recognition process and the
myriad hurdles involved in obtaining such recognition.
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A. The State-Recognized Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe of the Los
Angeles Basin
Of the tribes that have never been granted formal federal recog-
nition, the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe, 1' which was recognized by Cali-
fornia in 1994, is one of the best documented. The Gabrielinos once
occupied villages from Topanga Canyon in Malibu south to the New-
port Beach estuary, and inland to just shy of the city of San Bernar-
dino. 12 Over 2800 archeological sites, state and federal historical
records, and Catholic church records confirm the Tribe's history in
the Los Angeles basin. 13 The Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") identi-
fied and registered hundreds of members of the Gabrielino-Tongva
Tribe in the published California Indian Rolls of 1928, 1950, and
1972.14 Additionally, "'Blood Quantum Certificates"' have been
11. The Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe is alternately referred to as "Gabrielino-Tongva" or
"Tongva" throughout this Article. Reference is also made to the Gabrielino Indians, a more
general characterization. This larger category of American Indians encompasses the
Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe, however it also encompasses additional Gabrielino groups, such
as the San Gabriel Band of Gabrielino Indians, a small group of Indians in Beaumont,
California, who are not affiliated with either the Tongva or San Gabriel entities. See Tongva
Tribe, Gabrielino-Tongva Tribal Membership Rolls, http://www.tongvatribe.org/Mem-
bers/Members.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Tongva Tribe Website, Mem-
bers] (briefly describing the different Gabrielino Indian groups in California).
12. According to Thomas Blackburn, "The territory occupied by the wider Gabrielino
group included the greater portion of Los Angeles County, half of Orange County, parts of
San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, and the islands of Santa Catalina, San Clemente,
and probably San Nicolas." Thomas Blackburn, Ethnohistoric Descriptions of Gabrielino Mate-
rial Culture, in 5 UNIV. OF CAL. L.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES: ARCHEOLOGI-
CAL SURVEY ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1963).
13. See id. Physical evidence of Gabrielino-Tongva culture in Los Angeles is wide-
spread. For example, the State of California has registered an historical site in West Los
Angeles where Tongva tribal members shared spiritual natural groundwater springs in
1770 with one of the two expeditions that led to the founding of the City of Los Angeles.
See Tongva Tribe, Tribal History, http://www.tongvatribe.org/TribalHistory/tribal-history.
cfm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Tongva Tribe Website, History]. Loyola Mary-
mount University dedicated a garden to Tongva history in 2000, and its main library per-
manently exhibits artifacts from Tongva village sites unearthed during campus
construction. See Loyola Marymount Website, Gabrielino/Tongva Indians: The First Angelenos
Outdoor Memorial and Library Exhibit, http://www.lmu.edu/Page5460.aspx (last visited Dec.
21, 2005). Other historic sites have been uncovered at California State University at Long
Beach, the Sheldon Reservoir in Pasadena, the Los Encinos State Historical Park in En-
cino, and most recently by ongoing construction at the City of Los Angeles megaproject,
Playa Vista. See Cecilia Rasmussen, L.A. Scene: Southern California Then and Now, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1994, at B3; see also California State University, Long Beach, About Puvunga: Back-
ground on Puvunga and the Sacred Site Struggle, http://www.csulb.edu/-eruyle/puvudoc-
0000_about.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); Nick Madigan, Developer Unearths Burial Ground
and Stirs Up Anger Among Indians, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at Al 3.
14. See Tongva Tribe Website, Members, supra note 11.
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awarded to two more generations of children,' 5 many of whom are
now adult members of the 900-member Tribe.
The Tribe's relationship with the United States is equally well
documented, despite the Tribe's lack of federal status. Around the
time that California gained statehood in 1850,16 the Gold Rush and
the explosion of non-native and non-Spanish populations created an
immediate desire to define and delimit aboriginal rights. 17 During
1851 and 1852, President Millard Fillmore appointed three United
States Government Treaty Commissioners to quickly sign eighteen
federal treaties with California tribes, including Treaty D with the
Gabrielinos.18 The treaties were intended to reserve eight and one
half million acres of reservation land for California Indian tribes, in
exchange for the Indians' quitclaim of aboriginal title to a total of
seventy-five million acres of California land.19 The reservation prom-
ised in the Gabrielino's treaty included tens of thousands of acres
known as the San Sebastian Reserve at the Tejon Pass at the edge of
modern Los Angeles County.20
The federal government, through these eighteen treaties, sought
to bring order and protection, no matter how minimal, to the Native
American populations pressed by the rapid disappearance of the Cali-
fornia frontier. However, after lobbying by California business inter-
ests, the United States Senate refused to ratify any of the eighteen
treaties and instead placed an injunction of secrecy on their exis-
tence.2 1 After the Gabrielino treaty failed ratification, the San Sebas-
tian reserve was illicitly transferred and became the personal property
15. See id.
16. See State of Cal., History and Culture of California, at http://www.ca.gov (follow
hyperlink "History and Culture of California") (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
17. See CAL. DEP'T OF PARKS & RECREATION OFFICE OF HISTORIC PREs., FIVE VIEWS: AN
ETHNIC HISTORIC SITE SURVEY FOR CALIFORNIA: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS IN CALIFOR-
NIA: 1849-1879 (1988), available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/5views/
5viewslc.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) [hereinafter FIvE VIEWS].
18. See Tongva Tribe Website, Members, supra note 11.
19. See FIVE VIEWS, supra note 17.
20. San Sebastian was a 75,000-acre reservation to which a number of Gabrielino fami-
lies were relocated. For more information on San Sebastian Reserve, see Ridge Route Com-
munities Historical Soc'y & Museum-Tejon Page, http://www.frazmtn.com/-rrchs/
tejonie.html (last visited July 28, 2005) [hereinafter Ridge Route]. See also 18 Treaties-Cali-
fornia, http://www.angelfire.com/nt2/kawaiisu/18treaties.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006)
(confirming that the reserve encompassed 75,000 acres and providing a link to historical
maps of the reserve).
21. See FIVE VIEWS, supra note 17; see also Indians of Cal. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 583,
585 (1942), 1942 WL 4378 (noting the Senate's refusal to ratify the treaties).
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of the Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Edward Beale,
who renamed the property "Tejon Reserve." 22
The eighteen "lost treaties" were ultimately discovered in the Sen-
ate Archives in 1905.23 Upon their discovery, a series of flawed legal
efforts were made over the next seven decades to redress the subjuga-
tion of the Gabrielinos and other California Indians. 24 Treaty-less, and
now landless, the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe was never subsequently ac-
knowledged by the United States, despite the unofficial recognition of
their tribal status through the treaties authorized by President Millard
Fillmore in 1851.
The California legislature made one such effort to address the
Tribe's plight by passing the California Jurisdiction Act of 192825 ('ju-
risdiction Act"). The Jurisdiction Act authorized the California Attor-
ney General to represent "landless Indians" seeking compensation for
their unresolved equitable and land claims in the United States Court
of Claims.26 Nevertheless, two salient characteristics doomed the effec-
tiveness of the land claims settlement effort. First, no land claims set-
tlement was offered to the Tribe as a whole, only to individual tribal
members and their descendents who were deemed "landless Indians."
Second, money, not land, was offered-thus avoiding the ticklish ques-
tion of federal status and acknowledgment of the treaty-less Tribe. 27
Fourteen years later, in Indians of California v. United States,28 a
federal court acknowledged the arguments of the young California
Attorney General Earl Warren, agreeing that "a promise [was] made
to these tribes and bands of Indians and accepted by them but ... was
never fulfilled."29 Acting to recognize the equitable claims of the
Gabrielinos and "all the Indians of California," the court awarded
seven cents per acre as compensation to individual "landless Indians"
22. See FivE VIEWS, supra note 17 ("Tejon Reserve"); see also Ridge Route, supra note 20
(calling the property "Tejon Ranch" in the section entitled "After the War").
23. See Danny Ammon (Personal Home Page), Previous Recognition by the United
States Government of the Tsnungwe Tribe, http://www.dcn.davis.ca.us/-ammon/
tsnungwe/treaties.html (last visited July 27, 2005). Because of these and similar violations
of established treaties, California Indians now own less than one-sixth of the land on a per
capita basis of tribal members in other states. See Koenig, Gambling, supra note 7, at 1052
n.141 (citing Alliance of Cal. Tribes, California Indians Past and Present, http://www.alli-
anceofcatribes.org/californiaindians.htm).
24. See Tongva Tribe Website, History, supra note 13.
25. Jurisdiction Act, ch. 624, 45 Stat. 602 (1928), amended by ch. 222, 46 Stat. 259
(1930).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. 98 Ct. Cl. 583 (1942), 1942 WL 4378.
29. Id. at 592.
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for the 8.5 million acres of reservation lands that would have been set
aside for federal Indian reservations under the eighteen lost treaties. 30
At the time of the treaties' drafting, some ninety-four years earlier, no
public lands had been purchased by the United States for less than
$1.50 per acre-twenty-one times what was ultimately awarded.3 1 No
compensation was offered for the seventy-five million acres of Califor-
nia land actually taken from California Indian tribes, other than pay-
ment for the 8.5 million acres of reservation lands, and no federal
acknowledgment was given to the Indian tribes who had signed the
eighteen lost treaties. The court awarded no interest for the ninety-
four year period between signature of the 1851-52 treaties and
1944.32
After World War II reminded the public of the sacrifices of Native
American soldiers, the 1944 settlement amount was deemed inade-
quate, and a second effort to settle land claims began. Congress estab-
lished the Indian Claims Commission, which was empowered to hear a
broad range of claims by landless Indians against the United States,
including claims against the United States for taking aboriginal title to
lands.33 In addition, $10,000 of the "Indians of California" funds in
the United States Treasury was earmarked for services to be rendered
by an attorney in accordance with any contract of employment that
might be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.34 The Gabrielino-
Tongva and other Southern California tribes filed a land claim suit
before the Indian Claims Commission, known as Docket 80. 35 The
Southern California tribes were known as "Mission Indians"3 6 because
of their prior enslavement by the Spanish to build the historic Catho-
lic missions of Southern California. The Mission Indians were a sepa-
rate classification from the "Indians of California" and were
comprised of survivors of the forty-six bands of Gabrielino, Diegueno,
Luiseno, Serrano, and Juaneno tribes of Mission Indians. 37
After years of pursuing their case in the Indian Claims Commis-
sion, the Mission Indians received an offer for an out-of-court settle-
30. Id. at 589, 601 (noting the total acreage and referring the case to a commissioner
of the court to determine the value of the contested land).
31. See Tongva Tribe Website, History, supra note 13.
32. See Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cl. at 594-95, 1942 WL 4378, at *12-13.
33. Indian Claims Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 79-726 (1946).
34. Interior Department Appropriation Act, ch. 529, 60 Stat. 348, 361 (1946).
35. See, e.g., Baron Long (El Capitan) & Other Bands of Mission Indians of Cal. v.
United States, 217 Ct. CI. 668 (1978).
36. Id. at 668.
37. Id.
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ment made by the United States to all California Indians. 38 The land
claims settlement awarded $633 to each federally-registered member
of the Gabrielino Tribe, which was paid in 1972,39 some 121 years
after the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe signed their treaty. No attempt,
however, was made to consider or resolve the federal status or the
land claims of the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe itself.
The failure of the 1946 Indian Claims Commission to adequately
address the Tribe's sovereign status or to settle the Tribe's land claims
may be explained, in part, as a long-lasting by-product of the Eisen-
hower Administration's "assimilation policy," begun in the early 1950s
and later expressed legislatively as House Concurrent Resolution 108
of 1953.40 Under this policy, the United States Government termi-
nated thirty-eight federal Indian tribes in California.41 The tribal
members were paid cash for the sale of their land and otherwise en-
couraged to "assimilate," as if they were part of an amorphous immi-
grant group rather than a subjugated tribal sovereign. 42 Notably, the
Gabrielino's settlement and the "assimilation policy" were both ad-
ministered by Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon S. Myer, who had
previously served as Chief Administrator of the Japanese internment
camps in California. 43 In 1983, the unlawfulness of the Eisenhower
"assimilation policy" was recognized by the federal government, which
stipulated in Hardwick v. United States44 to reinstate federal acknowl-
edgment to seventeen terminated tribes.45 Unfortunately, because the
Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe was not a terminated rancheria tribe, the re-
versal of the assimilation policy provided them no remedy.
38. See Florence C. Shipek, Mission Indians and Indians of California Land Claims, AM.
INDIAN Q. 409, 417 (1989).
39. See Tongva Tribe Website, History, supra note 13.
40. Id. For an overview of the text and purpose of House Concurrent Resolution 108,
see Digital History, Native American Voices, House Concurrent Resolution 108, http://
www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/native._voices/voices_display.cfm?id=96 (last visited Nov. 21,
2005). H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953), 67 Stat. B132 (enacted).
41. See Alliance of Cal. Tribes, California Indians Past and Present, http://www.alli-
anceofcatribes.org/californiaindians.htm.
42. See Salish Kootenai Coll., The Termination Era (1950-1960), http://www.skc.
edu/netbook/10-termination-era.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
43. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219,
221-22 (1986) (explaining that Commissioner Meyer was in charge of the federal govern-
ment's overall termination plan).
44. Hardwick v. United States, No. C-79-1910-SW (N.D. Cal. 1983) (stipulation for
entry ofjudgment), available at http://sorrel.humboldt.edu/-nasp/hardwick.html (last vis-
ited June 8, 2005).
45. Id.
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Today, however, the Tribe and its 900 members continue as a
political group, thanks in part to the State of California. California
officially recognized the Gabrielino-Tongva as a California Indian
tribe in Joint Resolution Number 96, Chapter 146 of the Statutes of
1994.46 The resolution made the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe one of only
two non-federally-recognized tribes recognized by California. 47 The
Resolution reads:
[B]e it . . . Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of
California, jointly, [t]hat the State of California recognizes the
Gabrielinos as the aboriginal tribe of the Los Angeles Basin and
takes great pride in recognizing the Indian inhabitance of the Los
Angeles Basin and the continued existence of the Indian commu-
nity within our state. 48
Despite the Tribe's state recognition, its well-documented history
of physical evidence in the Los Angeles Basin, and its equally well-
documented history of interaction with the United States, the federal
government has yet to formally "acknowledge" the Gabrielino-Tongva
as an Indian tribe. 49 The Gabrielino-Tongva's lack of federal status
prevents the Tribe from acquiring federal rights or assistance granted
to 109 other California Indian tribes, many of which share a similar
history.50 The Tribe began the formal federal recognition process in
1994,51 but like the hundreds of other tribes waiting for federal ac-
knowledgment, resolution of their federal status is still years, if not
decades away, due to the time that it takes to satisfy all of the BIA's
requirements for federal recognition, and because the BIA generally
only resolves two petitions for recognition a year.52
Today, the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe hopes to establish gaming
under state law. The Tribe is taking a cooperative approach to gain
the right to engage in gaming to generate revenue to support its tribal
46. S.J. Res. 96, 1993-1994 Leg. Spec. Sess., ch. 146 (Cal. 1994).
47. The Juanenos Tribe of Orange County has also received state recognition. See S.J.
Res. 48, 1993-1994 Leg. Sess., ch. 121 (Cal. 1993).
48. Cal. SJ. Res. 96.
49. For a list of federally recognized tribes that excludes the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe,
see Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67 Fed. Reg. 46328-33 (July 12, 2002), available at http://
www.census.gov/pubinfo/www/FRN02.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
50. California's tribes have had an especially difficult time: "[A]lthough California
Indians make up twelve percent of Indians nationwide, they receive less than one percent
of all federal general assistance funds." Koenig, Gambling, supra note 7, at 1033 n.6; see also
Alliance of Cal. Tribes, supra note 41.
51. See 500 Nations, Petitions for Federal Recognition, http://www.500nations.com/
tribes/TribesPetitions.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (providing a list of federal recogni-
tion petitions for all tribes currently involved in the recognition process).
52. See Magagnini, supra note 9, at Al. For a partial explanation of why the federal
recognition process is so time-consuming, see infra Part II.E.2.
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government and its 900 tribal members. The Tribe hopes to establish
a cultural museum and catacomb to preserve the many archaeological
and human remains now owned by the Tribe, and to bring much
needed jobs and increased tourism to Los Angeles County.5 3
B. The State-Recognized Shinnecock Indian Nation of New York
Unlike the landless Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe, the 1300-member
Shinnecock Indian Nation of New York has managed to retain ap-
proximately 1200 acres of their original lands in the form of a state-
recognized reservation near the east end of Long Island.5 4 Neverthe-
less, even this acreage represents a significant decrease in lands com-
pared to the acreage the tribal nation once governed. In 1703, the
Tribe had exclusive control over approximately 3600 acres secured
through a 1000-year lease with the Town of Southampton. 55 That
holding dwindled to a mere 800 acre reservation in 1859 in a largely
one-sided deal designed to extend the Long Island Rail Road through
the Tribe's property. 56
As noted by the Tribe, it is "among the oldest self-governing
tribes of Indians in the United States." 57 Despite more than 200 years
of official recognition by the State of New York, almost 400 years of
contact with white settlers, and thousands of years in the greater New
York area,58 the Tribe has yet to be recognized by the United States
federal government. The Tribe first applied for formal recognition
53. Minutes of [Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe] December 18, 2005 Tribal Council Meeting
(Dec. 18, 2005) (on file with author).
54. See Shinnecock Indian Nation, Shinnecock Indian Nation: An Ancient History and
Culture, http://www.shinnecocknation.com/history.asp (last visitedJuly 14, 2005) [herein-
after Shinnecock Indian Nation History].
55. See Michael Powell, Old Money and Old Grievances Clash in Haven of the Very Rich;
Tribe's Lawsuit Seeks Return of 3,600 Acres of Prime Long Island Land, WASH. POST, June 25,
2005, at A03 (noting the Tribe is now trying to recover their original 3600 acres); see also
New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
56. See Tom Morris, Newsday, Long Island Our Story, Shinnecock Reservation: A Pain-
ful but Enduring Story of a People, http://www.newsday.com/community/guide/lihis-
tory/ny-historytown-hist008f,0,7048517.story (last visited Nov. 28, 2005); see also Powell,
supra note 55, at A03.
57. Shinnecock Indian Nation History, supra note 54.
58. See Harriet Crippen Brown Gumbs, Shinnecock, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERI-
CAN INDIANS (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1996), available at http://college.hmco.com/history/
readerscomp/naind/html/naI 035800_shinnecock.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2005); see also
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 489 (noting that "whether the Shinnecock
Indians were and are an Indian Tribe was decided in New York by the enactment of a law
by the New York State legislature and signed by the Governor in 1792, and that law remains
in effect today").
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with the BIA in 1978; more than twenty-seven years have already
passed without resolution. 59
Over the last several decades, the Tribe has undertaken several
forms of economic development to provide for its continued govern-
ance and the prosperity of its people. Nevertheless, long term efforts
to lease land to nearby farmers have been hampered by pesticide leak-
age, which severely polluted the Tribe's drinking water.60 A shellfish
hatchery, which took advantage of the Tribe's coastal location, also
had to be terminated due to pollution.61 An annual powwow is now
the Tribe's greatest money maker, but even that has proven inconsis-
tent thanks to uncertain weather. 62 Even in good years, income from
the powwow must be supplemented with state grants. 63 Consequently,
the Tribe is working to secure the right to open a casino to generate
the funds needed to help their government and members thrive. 64
As one of the biggest proponents of gaming by state-recognized
tribes, the Tribe is currently involved in extensive litigation to deter-
mine whether it has the right to open a casino on its tribal lands,
despite its lack of federal recognition. 65 At least one federal judge ap-
pears to have sympathized with the Tribe's frustration at its lack of
federal recognition and inability to game without such recognition. In
New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation,66 the United States was ordered
to appear as an "involuntary plaintiff," which would have effectively
made the court's orders binding upon the federal government.67
Judge Thomas C. Platt suggested he might eventually require the
United States to formally recognize the Shinnecock Tribe. 68
59. See Shinnecock Indian Nation History, supra note 54.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Gumbs, supra note 58.
64. See Shinnecock Indian Nation, FAQs About Indian Gaming, http://www.shin-
necocknation.com/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2006); see also Bruce Lambert, Shinnecock
Tribe Plans Suit, Claiming Land in Hamptons, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 9303809.
65. See Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); New York v.
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d I (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Another vocal proponent of
state tribal gaming is the state-recognized Unkechaug Nation, which has also been trying to
open a casino without federal recognition. See, e.g., Carruthers v. Flaum, 365 F. Supp. 2d
449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Steve Israel, Unkechaug Nation Buys Land Near Kutsher's, TIMES HEALD-
RicoRD (Middletown, N.Y.), available at http://www.recordonline.com/archive/2004/06/
15/siunkbac.html (free registration is necessary to access this hyperlink).
66. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
67. Id. at 491 (noting that the court impleaded the government).
68. See Ann Givens, Not Confined to the Reservation: Shinnecock Case Could Set National
Precedent, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2004, at A08, available at http://www.shinnecocknation.com/
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Although the court eventually dismissed the United States with
prejudice, 69 the Tribe's efforts continue. The Shinnecock Nation, pur-
suing a different route than the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe, no longer
passively sits back and waits out the legal process. Instead, in 2003, the
Tribe took controversial first steps towards opening a casino without
having secured federal recognition, including preparing a site for ca-
sino construction. 70 Most recently in early 2005, the Tribe demon-
strated its frustration with the lack of recognition of its gaming rights
by commencing a spectacular lawsuit claiming up to $150 billion dol-
lars of "back rent" for current and past use of aboriginal land in the
Hamptons. 71 Several sources have suggested that the Tribe's true goal
is to abandon the lawsuit in exchange for recognition of its right to
open a casino.72
In November 2005, as this Article was being edited for publica-
tion, the Tribe experienced a significant and controversial victory in
the courts. On November 7, Judge Platt held that the Shinnecock
qualify as a "tribe" for gaming purposes, despite their lack of federal
recognition, and determined that accordingly the Tribe is not obli-
gated to garner approval from the United States before developing
their New York properties. 73 While this opinion may be overturned at
the appellate level,74 Judge Platt's decision is strong validation of the
Shinnecock's claim for recognition.
news/news74.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) (discussing the potential role of the judiciary
in the federal recognition process of the Shinnecock Tribe); see also Michael Colello, Shin-
necock Casino Trial Begins in Spring, INDEPENDENT (East Hampton),Jan. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.shinnecocknation.com/news/news75.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2004) (noting a
trial may decide whether the tribe should be granted federal recognition status).
69. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (noting the government ulti-
mately chose to opt out of the case).
70. See Lambert, supra note 64; see also Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
71. Nation in Brief WASH. POST, June 16, 2005, at A30 (noting the Tribe is "seeking
billions of dollars for 150 years' worth of back rent on land it inhabited for 12,000 years in
New York state in one of the largest lawsuits of its kind").
72. See Ann Givens & Andrew Metz, Shinnecocks Stake a Hamptons Claim, NEWSDAY.COM,
June 12, 2005, http://www.newsday.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2005) (stating that "[e]xperts
familiar with the Shinnecock case say the tribe's endgame is probably not to evict [anyone]
from its land, but to force action on the tribe's bids for federal recognition and a South
Fork casino).
73. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
74. See Katie Thomas, The Judge Behind the Ruling, NEWSDAY.COM, Nov. 8, 2005, http://
www.newsday.com/news/local/longisland/ny-lijudgl 109,0,1255709.story?coll=ny-top-head
lines (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
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II. States and State-Recognized Tribes Have the Authority to
Enter into Gaming Compacts Outside of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA")
The conclusion that state-recognized tribes, such as the Gabrie-
lino-Tongva Tribe and the Shinnecock Indian Nation, may engage in
gaming under state law is built from traditional theories of tribal polit-
ical rights and the constitutional sovereignty of the states that recog-
nize them. This conclusion is based on five points:
First, while the federal government generally has jurisdiction over
tribal practices that impact non-tribal populations, gaming is a "vice
activity," a private liberty right regulated by states pursuant to their
authority under the Tenth Amendment. 75 Vice activities such as gam-
ing fall within the constitutional purview of state authority in the fed-
eralist system. Thus, the regulation of gaming will only fall under
federal authority where the federal government has preempted the
field.
Second, state-recognized tribes are sovereign governments with
limited but inherent sovereign powers, including the right to conduct
gaming activities, unless they are regulated as a "vice activity" by the
state or preempted by the federal government. Alternatively stated,
state tribes enjoy the same private liberty rights to conduct gaming as
other state citizens, subject to state or federal regulation.
Third, according to a growing line of federal case law, the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act 76 ("IGRA") only preempts the field of gaming
by federally-recognized tribes on federal "Indian land." Gaming by
state tribes, by other state-authorized parties, and even by federally-
recognized tribes that is not conducted on federal "Indian lands," is
not reached by IGRA. Thus, gaming by a state tribe on state-dominion
land, such as a State Indian reservation, remains within the purview of
Tenth Amendment state authority.
Fourth, gaming by state-recognized tribes does not violate equal
protection laws that forbid state governments from discriminating in
favor of one racial group, because like federal tribes, state tribes are
government entities and not a racially-defined group of individuals.
75. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("all is retained [by the states]
which has not been surrendered"); see also Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton,
353 F.3d 712, 737 (2003) (stating that the regulation of gambling as a "vice activity" is a
legitimate state interest).
76. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
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Finally, significant policy arguments, consistent with IGRA poli-
cies to support the economic well-being of federal tribes, also support
gaming by state-recognized tribes.
Opponents of state tribal gaming may argue that (1) federal law
preempts the field of Indian gaming in its entirety, whether or not the
federal government recognizes the Indian tribe in question, (2) fed-
eral law only permits gaming by federally-recognized tribes, and state-
recognized tribes have no inherent right to conduct gaming in the
absence of federal approval, and (3) allowing state-recognized tribes
to conduct gaming to the exclusion of the general population violates
equal protection mandates, by granting a "race-based" preference to a
Native American racial or ethnic group.77
As explained below, while federal law does preempt the field of
tribal gaming by federally-recognized tribes-those tribes that the fed-
eral government recognizes as subjugated tribal sovereigns and whose
gaming IGRA was designed to regulate and foster-federal law does
not preempt gaming by state-recognized tribes. Additionally, gaming
by state-recognized tribes does not violate equal protection guaran-
tees, because such gaming is permissibly based on a state-recognized
tribe's status as a state-recognized sovereign government-not the race
or ethnicity of the tribe or its individual members. As a result, states
and the tribal sovereigns they recognize have the right to enter into
mutually beneficial agreements to allow for tribal gaming in accor-
dance with state law.
A. The Regulation of Gaming Is Generally a State Power
To understand the various rights involved in gaming, it is impor-
tant to understand the layers of state, tribal, and federal jurisdiction
upon which current tribal gaming rights are built.
External tribal affairs-those extending beyond tribes' internal
self-governance-are generally subject only to federal jurisdiction. 7
Consequently, states usually have no power to regulate tribe-related
activities without Congress's express consent. It has been argued that
this precludes states and state-recognized tribes from entering into
gaming compacts, since Congress has not expressly authorized these
77. These arguments have been raised during the authors' work advocating on behalf
of state-recognized tribes.
78. See infra Section I.B for a discussion of the relationship between tribes and the
federal government.
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gaming agreements. 79 This view, however, may be too simplistic and
may place too severe a limit on state and tribal rights.
States have constitutional authority to regulate vice activities con-
ducted on state land pursuant to powers reserved by the United States
Constitution's Tenth Amendment.80 At the heart of this is a state's
power to regulate all forms of gambling that have not been expressly
prohibited by the federal government, which has been recognized re-
peatedly. 81 As recently stated by the Ninth Circuit, "circuits . . . have,
by and large, held that 'the regulation of gambling lies at the heart of
the state's police power."' 82
The first layer of our analysis, then, recognizes that any commer-
cial or tribal gaming conducted within state borders (as opposed to
the borders of a federal Indian reservation) would be a vice activity
generally regulated under state, and not federal, jurisdiction. One
Eighth Circuit case recognized that this reserved state power even ap-
plies to Indian gaming if such gaming is conducted outside a federal
Indian reservation and on land subject to state dominion. 83 As we ex-
plain below, the states' federalist authority to regulate vice activities
extends not only to gaming by private parties operating on lands
under state dominion, but to state-recognized Indian tribes operating
on a State Indian reservation or on other state lands.
CONCLUSION ONE: Gaming is a "vice activity," a private liberty
right regulated pursuant to state authority under the Tenth Amend-
ment. Vice activities such as gaming fall within the constitutional pur-
view of state authority in the federalist system, and so gaming conduct
79. Meeting with Bill Lockyer, Cal. Attorney Gen., in Sacramento, Cal. (April 2004)
(arguments made by attorneys from the California Department of Justice).
80. According to the Tenth Amendment, "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
81. See, e.g., Ah Sin v. Whitman, 198 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1905) ("The suppression of
gambling is concededly within the police powers of a State, and legislation prohibiting it,
or acts which may tend to or facilitate it, will not be interfered with by the court unless such
legislation be a 'clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured [sic] by the fundamen-
tal law.'"); People v. Sullivan, 141 P.2d 230, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943) ("The Supreme Court
of the United States recognizes the right of the State to prohibit or regulate gambling and
other acts which may affect public morals."); Mansker v. State, 1 Mo. 452, 459 (1824) ("It
certainly will not be denied, that, under our federal system, each state has a right to regu-
late its own internal policy, on all subjects, when they are not limited by the Constitution of
the United States.").
82. Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton (Artichoke Joe's II), 353 F.3d 712, 737
(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Helton v. Hunt, 330 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2003)).
83. See Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1108-09 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting
that IGRA does not preempt all forms of tribal gaming, including off-reservation internet
gaming conducted by an Indian tribe).
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falls under federal authority only where the federal government has
expressly preempted the field.
B. Tribes Are Sovereign Governments with Inherent Rights
Including the Right to Game, Except as Preempted by
the Federal Government
Sovereign tribes generally have the power to regulate and engage
in gaming within their borders, except when that right has been ex-
pressly preempted by the federal government.8 4 The parameters of
tribal jurisdiction over gaming activities, that is, the authority to con-
duct gaming activities unless otherwise prohibited by positive enact-
ment, is the next layer of analysis. In particular, we must determine
what gaming rights state tribes enjoy, absent federal preemption.
We begin by examining the powers of a sovereign tribe, whether
or not it is federally acknowledged. Sovereignty is one of the most
powerful concepts in Indian life and government, as well as Indian
law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines a "sovereign" as "[a] person,
body or state vested with independent and supreme authority. ''85
BLACK'S further defines "sovereign state" as "[a] state that possesses an
independent existence, being complete in itself, without being merely
part of a larger whole to whose government it is subject."86 A recent
article describes sovereignty as "supreme legal authority."8 7 While
these definitions suggest that tribal sovereigns, like national sover-
eigns, should be able to do whatever they want within their borders, a
tribe's sovereign relationship with the United States is more complex.
The United States holds dominion over all Indian tribes within its
borders because, unlike sovereign nations, Indian tribes were con-
quered by the United States. At some point, directly or indirectly, all
Indian tribes were subjugated by force. As a result, as noted by the
preeminent tribal scholar Felix S. Cohen, tribal authority is not su-
preme because tribal authority can be limited by federal law.88
The next layer of our analysis must then ask, in what ways tribal
sovereignty has been subordinated by the federal government, and in
84. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5-6 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3075-76.
85. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004).
86. Id.
87. Peter d'Errico, Sovereignty: A Brief History in the Context of U.S. "Indian Law," in 2
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MINORITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Jeffrey D. Schultz et al. eds., Oryx
Press, 2000), available at http://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/sovereignty.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2004).
88. See COHEN'S 1971 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 123.
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what ways is that authority still supreme? What sovereign powers still
exist, and which have been extinguished? The answers do not come
from the literal language of the United States Constitution. The Con-
stitution mentions Indian tribes only twice, once to exclude Indians
from the per capita assessments used for distributing representatives
and tax dollars 9 and once to include commerce with Indian tribes
within the federal Commerce Power.90 Rather, traditional and time-
honored concepts of a limited tribal sovereignty arise from judicial
interpretations of constitutional principles and principles of common
law.
Judicial opinions repeatedly recognize the right of subjugated tri-
bal sovereigns to govern their internal affairs. The United States Su-
preme Court first acknowledged that an Indian tribe possesses an
inherent sovereign right to tribal self-government in an 1832 case in-
volving the Cherokee Nation, Worcester v. Georgia.9t The Court ex-
plained that the Cherokee Nation possessed inherent or self-evident
powers as the supreme governmental authority over its members, but
also that its authority was necessarily limited by the Cherokee Nation's
"dependency" on the United States.9 2 The Supreme Court found an
historic harmony in the relationship between the Tribe and the fed-
eral government, not unlike the federalist model and its balancing of
state and federal powers. 93 The Worcester Court recognized that sover-
eign powers of an Indian tribe were self-evident, arising from an In-
dian tribe's original status as a self-governing sovereign. 94 Sovereign
powers are not granted by external powers such as the federal govern-
ment, or by the act of federal recognition, but are partly based on
natural law and partly historical.9 5 The Supreme Court also found fed-
eral law formed a natural limitation to an Indian tribe's sphere of au-
thority, by merit of its subjugation.96 The independent sovereign was
conquered, but still possessed those natural and historical powers of
sovereignty that the conqueror had not confiscated.
89. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
90. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
91. 31 U.S. 515, 581 (1832).
92. Id. at 556-61; COHEN'S 1971 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 124.
93. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 549-61.
94. See COHEN'S 1971 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 122-23 (explaining that Indian na-
tions have supreme authority over their internal affairs, and that such tribes are under the
federal government's protection).
95. Id. at 122.
96. Id. at 123.
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Over the next 170 years, additional judicial interpretations coa-
lesced this notion of tribal sovereignty into three foundational
principles:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of
any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the
legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates
the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to
enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect
the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-
government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by trea-
ties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus ex-
pressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in
the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of
government.
9 7
Thus, tribes have authority to do as they wish on their tribal
lands, including conduct gaming, except where those rights have
been expressly subordinated to an active federal power.
[T]reaties and statutes of Congress have been looked to by the
courts as limitations upon original tribal powers .... This is but an
application of the general principle that "[i]t is only by positive
enactments, even in the case of conquered and subdued nations,
that their laws are changed by the conqueror."98
Ultimately, the federal government, when it directly or indirectly
subordinated tribes, only took certain rights and left other "sovereign
rights" intact. In this sense, tribal sovereigns are comparable to the
fifty state sovereigns, whose inherent powers are reserved by the Tenth
Amendment. Judicial opinions have created a protective penumbra of
case law around the notion of inherent, natural, historical, or self-evi-
dent tribal sovereignty, albeit one more permeable to active federal
enactment than state powers. Accordingly, Indian tribes today remain
self-governed entities that retain all powers of governance, including
the power to conduct or permit gaming activities within their sphere
of operation that have not been expressly preempted by Congress. 99
The next layer of the analysis must then investigate whether this
subordinate sovereign status applies equally to both federal and state
tribes. The answer must be yes. State tribes and federal tribes were
both subjugated, directly or indirectly, by force, and both were true
sovereigns prior to that subjugation. Applying the three principles
above, (1) a state tribe (like a federal tribe) initially possessed all the
97. Id.
98. Id. at 122 (partially quoting Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 51 (1845)).
99. This Article does not consider the related issue of whether either state or federal
tribes possess the right to conduct gaming without a state compact.
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powers of any sovereign state, (2) conquest rendered the tribe subject
to the legislative power of the United States, (3) making the state
tribe's powers subject to qualification by treaties and by express legis-
lation of Congress, but except as expressly qualified, full powers of
internal sovereignty must still be vested in the state tribes and their
duly constituted organs of government. Certainly in the case of the
Gabrielino-Tongva, whose 1851 treaty was signed but never ratified,
their inherent sovereignty was recognized by at least one President, 100
helping to establish that the United States government once acknowl-
edged them as a bona fide tribe.
None of the three principles above suggest that federal recogni-
tion is a prerequisite to a tribe's inherent sovereignty. 10 1 Federal ac-
knowledgment is one important way that the superior federal power
has exercised its legislative power, but nothing in the Indian tribe's
lack of federal status appears to dissolve this inherent, self-evident,
natural, and historical authority. This argument garners additional
support from Felix S. Cohen: "From the earliest years of the Republic
the Indian tribes have been recognized as 'distinct, independent, po-
litical communities,' and, as such, qualified to exercise powers of self-
government, not by virtue of any delegation of powers from the Federal Gov-
ernment, but rather by reason of their original tribal sovereignty."10 2 Since
such powers do not depend on the federal government for their exis-
tence, state tribes such as the Gabrielinos and Shinnecocks must still
be sovereign, irrespective of federal recognition. Treaties and legisla-
tion merely confirm sovereign status-they do not grant it. Federal
recognition, as the name implies, is a gestalt reflection of the inherent
power of state tribes; federal acknowledgement is neither its creation
nor its source.
Ultimately, then, since tribal sovereignty is inherent, self-evident,
natural, and historical, it is independent of the sanction of federal law
and continues to exist even in the absence of federal recognition. 03
Because state-recognized tribes were subjugated just like federally-rec-
100. See infra Part L.A (discussing President Millard Fillmore's appointment of three
commissioners to sign eighteen federal treaties with California tribes, including the
Gabrielinos).
101. But see, e.g., New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d I (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (suggesting that the BIA is in the best position to determine whether a tribe is, in
fact, sovereign).
102. COHEN'S 1971 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 122 (emphasis added).
103. But see Carruthers v. Flaum, 365 F. Supp. 2d 448, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that
because the Unkechaug tribe is only state-recognized, and not federally-recognized, the
tribe is not sovereign).
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ognized tribes, state-recognized tribes must retain the same inherent
sovereign rights as those that are federally-recognized. What state
tribes would not qualify for are those government benefits that the
federal government grants solely to those tribes it recognizes. As
demonstrated above, state tribes' inherent sovereign power would in-
clude the power to conduct vice activities such as gaming, except
where the federal government has affirmatively provided otherwise.
For state tribes, within that sphere of tribal authority must lie the
power to enter into an agreement with the state sovereign that recog-
nizes the tribe, absent an express federal prohibition otherwise. As
explained below, while the federal government has placed express
limits on the gaming activities of federally-recognized tribes, federal law
has not so limited this sovereign power of state-recognized tribes.
CONCLUSION TWO: State-recognized tribes are sovereign gov-
ernments with limited but inherent sovereign powers, including the
right to conduct gaming activities, except as regulated as a vice activity
by the state or preempted by the federal government.
C. The Federal Government Has Only Preempted the Field of
Gaming by Federally-Recognized Tribes, Not Gaming by
State Citizens, State Corporations, or State-
Recognized Tribes
The next layer of analysis addresses federal preemption. If state
tribes, like federal tribes, hold inherent, self-evident, natural, or his-
torical sovereign powers to conduct gaming we must look to where
federal enactments limit tribal and state sovereignty.10 4
Preemption is "[t] he principle . . .that a federal law can super-
sede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation."'10 5 There
are two federal acts that directly apply to federal tribal gaming and so
arguably might preempt gaming by a state tribe: IGRA10 6 and the
Johnson Act.10 7 As explained below, neither act applies to state tribes.
Therefore, neither act preempts gaming by a state tribe pursuant to a
compact with its respective state.
104. The related question of where a state tribe may conduct gaming activities is not
broached. For the purpose of argument, it is assumed that the state tribe will choose to
conduct gaming activities with the express agreement of the state that recognizes it.
105. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1216 (8th ed. 2004).
106. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
107. Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178.
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1. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
a. Background to IGRA: The Cabazon Case
The seminal case that led to the creation of IGRA and provides
context to preemption challenges in an Indian gaming setting is the
1987 United States Supreme Court case California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians. 108 The Cabazon case concerned several federally-recog-
nized California Tribes that were running bingo operations, even
though California law prohibited such a vice activity within state bor-
ders. 10 9 No federal enactment prevented gaming on federal Indian
reservations, and the Tribes were frustrated at the State's insistence
that state law applied to make gaming conducted on federal reserva-
tions unlawful. 110 The Tribes argued that they had the sovereign
power to conduct gaming on their sovereign lands, which were under
federal and not state control; California argued the Tribes' bingo op-
erations illegally conflicted with the State's anti-gaming laws.1"'
The Supreme Court ultimately found in favor of the Tribes," 2
explaining that state law only applies on federal Indian reservations in
certain circumstances: "[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and
subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States .... It is
clear, however, that state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their
reservations if Congress has expressly so provided."' 1 3 The Court con-
cluded that gaming fell within the limited sphere of tribal sovereignty,
and no positive federal enactments applied to limit the scope of In-
dian gaming. 1 4 California's gaming laws could only be applied on
lands under the dominion of California, not on federal Indian
lands. 1'5
The Court in Cabazon also looked at whether the State's jurisdic-
tion over gaming had been preempted by federal law." 6 It noted that
"[s] tate jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes or is incompatible
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the
state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state au-
108. 480 U.S. 202, 215-21 (1987).
109. Id. at 204-06.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 207.
113. Id. (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 221-22.
115. See id. at 207-12.
116. Id. at 203, 216.
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thority."11 7 The Court weighed the federal and tribal interests in en-
couraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development and
found them complimentary." 8 However, the State's interest in regu-
lating tribal gaming, illustrated by California's purported purpose to
prevent organized crime from infiltrating tribal gaming operations,
conflicted with federal and tribal interests. 11 9 Because the federal in-
terest in furthering tribes' economic well-being was paramount, the
state law was preempted. 20 Allowing state regulation to intrude, in
this case, would be inconsistent with tribal and federal interests in tri-
bal self-sufficiency, and thus was impermissible. 12 1
Ultimately, Cabazon left two lasting contributions to the long line
of judicial interpretations delimiting tribal sovereignty. First, it af-
firmed that in the absence of a positive federal enactment to the con-
trary, tribal governments are the supreme authority to conduct and
regulate gaming on Indian lands under their jurisdiction. Cabazon
thus falls in line with traditional notions of tribal sovereignty as an
inherent, self-evident, natural, and historical power possessed by In-
dian tribes but limited by federal enactment. Second, Cabazon set
forth a preemption analysis applicable to tribal gaming, becoming the
first of several cases to apply a federal preemption analysis to tribal
gaming and thereby illustrating the interplay between tribal, federal,
and state jurisdictions.
b. Framework of IGRA
After the Cabazon case was published, the absence of recognized
state authority on federal Indian gaming terrified and infuriated Cali-
fornia and other states.122 In many instances, federal Indian reserva-
tions were within easy driving distance of major metropolitan areas.
State anti-gaming laws now had big, geographic holes in which Indian
tribes and entrepreneurial casino developers might develop casinos to
generate large sums of cash to the exclusion of others. In response to
state outcry over the nearly instantaneous growth of Indian gaming on
federal Indian lands, Congress established IGRA in 1988123 to ex-
117. Id. at 216 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333-34
(1983)).
118. Id. at 216-19.
119. Id. at 219-22.
120. Id. at 221-22.
121. Id. at 222.
122. See Koenig, Gambling, supra note 7, at 1038-39; see also Nat'l Indian Gaming
Comm'n, Home Page, http://www/nigc.gov (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
123. Indian Gaming Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
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pressly "grant[ I] states some role in the regulation of Indian gam-
ing"'124 and thereby balance state interests in regulating gaming within
state borders with federal interests in allowing federal tribes to oper-
ate casinos on federal Indian reservations to support tribal
economies. 25
With IGRA, Congress asserted its dormant federal powers over
tribal sovereigns and established the first formal non-Indian regula-
tion of Indian casinos. IGRA organized tribal gaming into three clas-
ses, each of which became subject to different degrees of regulation. It
delegated a major regulatory role to states through the requirement
of a state tribal compact to engage in the highest class of gaming,
Class III. This class, which includes the use of highly lucrative slot ma-
chines, may only be conducted by a tribe if the state allows such gam-
ing within its borders and a tribal gaming agreement (or "compact")
is entered into with the state. 126 In contrast, Class II gaming consists of
bingo and non-electronic card games 127 and is subject to IGRA and
tribal jurisdiction, but does not require the tribe to enter into an ex-
press compact with the state. 128 Finally, Class I gaming, which prima-
rily includes traditional Indian games, 129 is exempt from state and
federal oversight and remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of
tribes. 1 3 0
Some 354 Indian casinos, all run by federally-recognized tribes,
are now operating under the IGRA framework, pursuant to compacts
negotiated by the governors of twenty-eight states.' 3'
124. Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton (Artichoke Joe's II), 353 F.3d 712, 715
(9th Cir. 2003). According to the Ninth Circuit:
IGRA was Congress' compromise solution to the difficult questions involving In-
dian gaming. The Act was passed in order to provide "a statutory basis for the
operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments. .. ." IGRA is an
example of "cooperative federalism" in that it seeks to balance the competing
sovereign interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian
tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory scheme.
Id. at 715 (quoting Artichoke Joe's v. Norton (Artichoke Joe's 1), 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092
(E.D. Cal. 2002)).
125. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 998
(Cal. 1999).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(c).
127. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (2).
129. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).
131. See Nat'l Indian Gaming Ass'n Library & Resource Ctr., Indian Gaming Facts,
http://www.indiangaming.org/library/indian-gaming-facts/index.shtml (last visited June
18, 2005).
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c. IGRA Does Not Preempt State Tribal Gaming Because IGRA
Does Not Apply to State-Recognized Tribes
While IGRA explicitly preempts the state regulation of gaming by
federally-recognized tribes on federal Indian reservations, IGRA does
not preempt gaming by state tribes on state-dominion lands, as ex-
plained below. 132 Accordingly, states should be free to reach gaming
agreements with state tribes to pursue gaming under state law and on
state-dominion lands, such as a State Indian reservation.
State gaming is not preempted by IGRA for two reasons: (1) gam-
ing by state tribes falls outside IGRA's field of preemption, which only
covers gaming by federally-recognized tribal sovereigns on federal In-
dian lands, and (2) even if gaming by state-recognized tribes falls
within IGRA's parameters, state jurisdiction is compatible with IGRA
itself. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that IGRA did preempt the
field of gaming for all Indian tribes on all lands, state and tribal regu-
lation of gaming by state-recognized tribal sovereigns must still be
allowed.
i. State-Authorized Gaming by a State Tribe on State-Dominion
Lands Falls Outside IGRA's Preemptive Field
Traditional preemption analysis has two steps. First, any poten-
tially relevant federal legislation is analyzed to see what "field" is pre-
132. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3075 (noting in its discussion of IGRA that "today, tribal governments retain all rights that
were not expressly relinquished"). In a painstakingly researched article that scrutinizes the
origins of the federal government's power over Native Americans, scholar Mark Savage
posits the novel theory that the United States Constitution never granted the federal gov-
ernment plenary power (and therefore preemptive power) over even federally-recognized
tribes. In his article, he argues that:
The United States-its President, its Congress, and its Supreme Court-can exer-
cise no power over Native Americans unless the Constitution grants it. Examina-
tion of the text of the Constitution, the intentions of the Framers, contemporary
notions about sovereignty, the records of the Continental Congress, and contem-
porary treaties with Native American nations makes it clear that the Constitution
has never granted to the United States a plenary power over Native Americans.
Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 57, 115-16 (1991) (citations omitted). Consequently, he argues that "[t]wo hun-
dred years of decisions by the Supreme Court and legislation by Congress and the Presi-
dent lack constitutional authority." Id. at 60. Although years of precedent ignoring this
history have rendered his position moot, as advocated by Savage this argument may still be
used "to challenge exercises of state and federal power over Native Americans and their
lands and thus to accomplish the ends of self-determination and self-government." Id. at
118.
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empted.' 33 If the state or tribal activity falls outside the preempted
field, the activity stands.13 4 If the target activity falls within the pre-
empted field, the second step is to determine whether state or tribal
regulation conflicts or interferes with federal regulation.1 35 If there is
no such conflict or interference, then such regulation may coexist
side-by-side with federal regulation, and again the activity stands. 136
So what field of gaming does IGRA preempt? Clearly, IGRA does
not preempt state authority over non-Indian vice activities. States re-
tain their inherent constitutional police power over vice activities
within their borders, including exclusive authority over non-tribal
gaming. For example, Nevada and NewJersey continue to allow exten-
sive gaming activities in Las Vegas and Atlantic City under their re-
spective state laws. Such gaming lies outside IGRA's preemptive field.
California allows more limited gaming activities by card rooms and
horse racing tracks.137 In addition, California itself runs a state lot-
tery138 and permits gaming for non-profit purposes.139 IGRA, by its
own terms, applies only to gaming conducted on federal "Indian
lands"1 40 and by federal "Indian tribes."141 Neither term appears to
reach state-recognized tribes or gaming under state law on state-do-
minion lands.
IGRA defines "Indian lands" in two parts. "Indian lands" are, first,
"any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for
the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian
tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against
alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental
133. See 41 AM.JUR. 2D Indians; Native Ameicans § 47 (2005) (noting that "[s]tatejuris-
diction or regulatory authority over activities... is preempted by the operation of federal
law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal
law") (partially citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983)).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.; see also, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960) ("In determining whether state regulation has been pre-empted by federal action,
'the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not
covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress
has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words,
such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual
conflict with the law of the State.'" (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912)).
137. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 1008
(Cal. 1999) (comparing the types of gaming permitted in Nevada and New Jersey with that
permitted in California).
138. CAt.. CONST. art. IV, §19, cl. d.
139. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, §19, cl. f (referring to the Constitution's second clause f).
140. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (2000).
141. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)-(2).
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power,"142 and second, "all lands within the limits of any [federal] In-
dian reservation."1
43
The first part of the definition explicitly references a federal juris-
diction requirement by limiting "Indian lands" to those held in trust
or subject to restriction by the United States. The lands of state-recog-
nized tribes, however, are generally not held in trust by the federal
government due to the fact that the tribe is not federally-recog-
nized.1 44 Absent federal acknowledgment of an Indian tribe, one is
hard-pressed to argue that any State Indian reservation or other gam-
ing facility would fall under federal restriction.
The second part of the definition, "Indian reservation," generally
refers to federal, not state, reservations. As explained in Enlow v.
Bevenue,t 45 "[g]radually the term [Indian reservation] has come to de-
scribe 'federally-protected Indian tribal lands,' meaning those lands
which Congress has set apart for tribal and federal jurisdiction."1 46
Under IGRA, the Secretary of the Interior recognizes Indian lands by
calling the lands "reservations." For example, gaming is permitted on
lands acquired after October 17, 1988 when "lands are taken into trust
as part of ... the initial reservation of an Indian tribe acknowledged by
the Secretary under the Federal acknowledgment process, or ... the restora-
tion of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recogni-
tion."147 Also, "[a]n Indian reservation is a reservation of land that
Congress has withdrawn from the public domain for a variety of pur-
poses, including Indian autonomy."'14 Therefore, IGRA only reaches
Indian gaming on federally supervised Indian land.
As a result, gaming on state-dominion lands, including a State
Indian reservation, falls outside IGRA. A similar conclusion was
reached in the 2005 case, Nixon v. Coeur dAlene Tribe.149 In Nixon, a
federal Indian tribe conducting gaming on federal lands decided to
undertake a new gaming activity, internet gaming, but from a location
off their reservation and within the state-dominion lands of Mis-
142. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (B).
143. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A).
144. Thirteen states have state Indian reservations: Alabama, California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, NewJersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Virginia. See Alexa Koenig &Jonathan Stein, 2004 SURVEY OF STATE-RECOG-
NIZED TRIBES 2 (2004) (unpublished report, on file with the authors).
145. 4 Okla. Trib. 175 (Muscogee (Creek) Sup. Ct. 1994)
146. Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
147. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (emphasis added).
148. Goodman Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 28 P.3d 996, 1000 (Idaho 2001)
(emphasis added).
149. 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999).
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souri. 1 50 The State sued to stop internet gaming by the Tribe, but the
Tribe argued that IGRA preempted state law and prevented Missouri
from stopping the Tribe's gaming activity. 15 1 The court found IGRA
did not preempt state jurisdiction, even though the Tribe was feder-
ally-recognized and did conduct other gaming under IGRA, because
the internet gaming was conducted outside federal "Indian lands":
IGRA established a comprehensive regulatory regime for tribal
gaming activities on Indian lands. Both the language of the statute
and its legislative history refer only to gaming on Indian lands ....
Once a tribe leaves its own lands and conducts gambling activities
on state lands, nothing in the IGRA suggests that Congress in-
tended to preempt the State's historic right to regulate this contro-
versial class of economic activities. For example, if the State of
Missouri sought an injunction against the Tribe conducting an in-
ternet lottery from a Kansas City hotel room, or a floating crap
game in the streets of St. Louis, the IGRA should not completely
preempt such a law enforcement action simply because the injunc-
tion might "interfere with tribal governance of gaming." . . If the
Tribe's lottery is being conducted on its lands, then the IGRA com-
pletely preempts the State's attempt to regulate or prohibit. But if
the lottery is being conducted on Missouri lands, the IGRA does
not preempt the state law claims-indeed, it does not even appear
to provide a federal defense-and the case must be remanded to
state court.15 2
Pursuant to the Tenth Amendment and the inherent state au-
thority to regulate vice activities, gaming by state citizens, state corpo-
rations, state tribes, and even federal tribes on lands other than
federal Indian lands can be conducted under state law. If state law
allows these activities, the state law itself is not preempted by federal
regulation under IGRA.
Further,just as IGRA does not reach beyond federal Indian lands
to lands under state jurisdiction, IGRA does not reach beyond feder-
ally-recognized tribes to state-recognized tribes. By its own terms,
IGRA only regulates gaming by an "Indian tribe," a term defined
within IGRA as
any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or com-
munity of Indians which ... is recognized as eligible by the Secre-
tary for the special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians, and... is recog-
nized [by the Secretary of Interior] as possessing powers of self-
government. 153
150. Id. at 1104.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1108-09 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
153. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (A)-(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
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This Secretary of the Interior recognition requirement limits the
scope of the definition to those tribes that have attained formal fed-
eral acknowledgment.
Case law confirms that IGRA only applies to federal tribes. As ex-
plained in First American Casino Corp. v. Eastern Pequot Nation:154
IGRA does not apply [to the parties' agreement] because defen-
dant has not attained formal federal recognition and therefore is
not an "Indian tribe" within the meaning of IGRA. Unless and un-
til defendant obtains federal acknowledgment, its activities are not
regulated by IGRA .... Because IGRA's text unambiguously limits
its scope to gaming by tribes that have attained federal recognition,
[IGRA] does not apply to defendant's gaming-related activities. 1 55
First American Casino Corp. was a breach of contract case involving
a gaming management contract entered into by the defendant East-
ern Pequots, a state tribe that sought to conduct gaming under IGRA
but lacked formal federal recognition. 156 The plaintiff argued that the
defendant Tribe had breached the agreement by negotiating with
third parties to find someone other than the plaintiff to finance, de-
velop, and manage the Tribe's future casino.15 7 The defendant Tribe
removed the case to federal court on the theory that the federal court
had subject matter jurisdiction, since the management contract neces-
sarily implicated IGRA.' 58 The court ultimately disagreed and held
there was no subject matter jurisdiction-IGRA did not apply because
the Eastern Pequots had not yet received formal federal
recognition. 159
The court also rejected the Eastern Pequot's additional argument
that IGRA completely preempted the field of tribal gaming, including
gaming by a state tribe. The court stated:
The issue here is whether defendant has shown a clear congres-
sional intent in IGRA to completely preempt plaintiffs state law
claims. Two cases from the Eighth Circuit indicate that IGRA com-
pletely preempts the field of regulating Indian gaming when the
statute applies .... However, both cases also indicate that IGRA
has no such power if it does not apply .... Because IGRA's text
unambiguously limits its scope to gaming by tribes that have at-
tained federal recognition, the statute does not apply to defen-
154. 175 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D. Conn. 2000).
155. Id. at 208-10 (citing Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 792 n.4 (lst Cir.
1996) ("[IGRA] has no application to tribes that do not seek and attain formal federal
recognition.")).
156. Id. at 206.
157. Id. at 207.
158. Id. at 206.
159. Id. at 206-08.
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dant's gaming-related activities. Accordingly, plaintiffs state law
claims are not completely preempted by IGRA. 160
The court explained that the Supreme Court has found complete pre-
emption in only three areas, and Indian gaming is not one of them. 161
Other cases support the thesis that IGRA does not reach gaming
by state tribes. In 2003, the Ninth Circuit found "[t] he operative terms
of IGRA expressly relate only to tribes, not to individual Indians ....
Indeed... only federally recognized tribes are covered."' 162 It also noted,
"IGRA pertains to Indian lands and to tribal self-government and
[the] tribal status of federally recognized tribes."'163 Thus, gaming by a
state tribe that is not federally-recognized would not lie within IGRA's
preemptive field. Accordingly, such gaming would remain within the
purview of state authority and the state's recognized tribes. Gaming by
a state tribe on state-dominion land remains within the constitutional
purview of state and tribal authority, and state-recognized tribes may
conduct gaming activities pursuant to a gaming agreement with the
state that recognizes them.
ii. Even if Gaming by State-Recognized Tribes Falls Within IGRA's
Preemptive Field, Gaming by State Tribes Under State Law
Should Still Be Allowable Since Such Gaming Would Not
Conflict with IGRA's Underlying Purposes
The body of case law described above only addresses the first step
of the preemption analysis. Despite our conclusion, since no case has
expressly confirmed that gaming by state tribes falls outside IGRA's
preemptive field, it is important to turn to the second step, which ex-
amines whether activities that fall within the preempted field are, in
fact, preempted. Assuming for the sake of argument that gaming by
state tribes lies within the preempted field, it must be determined
whether the state or tribal regulation that would authorize the state
160. Id. at 209-10 (internal citations omitted).
161. Id. at 209. The three fields that have been completely preempted are (1) em-
ployer-labor organization contract violations (preempted by the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act); (2) benefit claims made under employee benefit plans (preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act); and (3) Indian tribes' aboriginal lands claims
(preempted by federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1362). Id.
162. Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton (Artichoke Joe's I1), 353 F.3d 712, 734
(9th Cir. 2003) (third emphasis added).
163. Id. at 736.
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tribal gaming conflicts with IGRA. 164 If not, then such regulation may
still coexist with IGRA and would not be preempted. 165
Several cases involving Indian gaming analyze when an assertion
of state authority would be consistent with, and therefore not pre-
empted by, IGRA. 166 For example, in Hotel Employees & Restaurant Em-
ployees International Union v. Davis,167 the California Supreme Court
stressed that IGRA does not exempt gaming on Indian lands from
state regulatory laws and, therefore, does not preempt state laws regu-
lating gaming, even by federal tribes on federal Indian reservations.168
"IGRA does not exempt gambling on Indian lands from state regula-
tory laws. Indeed, section 23 of IGRA provides that 'for purposes of
Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or
prohibition of gambling. . . shall apply in Indian country.'"
1 69
In Hotel Employees, a number of parties, including a labor union,
sought to invalidate Proposition 5, the Tribal Government Gaming
and Economic Self-Sufficiency Act of 1998.170 Proposition 5 was a
voter initiative authorizing Las Vegas-style gaming in tribal casinos.1 71
The Union argued that the proposition conflicted with state and fed-
eral law and, therefore, was invalid.172 The California Supreme Court
agreed, explaining the proposition authorized forms of gaming that
the California Constitution prohibited. 173 The Tribes countered, argu-
ing that regardless of the California Constitution, IGRA preempted
the regulation of Indian gaming by California including the state con-
stitution's anti-casino provision.174 The California Supreme Court dis-
agreed and found that IGRA itself preserved state authority; IGRA's
provisions limited its own preemptive reach by requiring that Indian
164. See, e.g., Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990
(Cal. 1999); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Hull, 945 P.2d 818 (Ariz. 1997).
Both cases are discussed throughout this section. See also Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Jurisdiction
Issues Arising Under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 197 A.L.R. FED. 459, 488-95, 510-17
(2005).
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 1011 (holding the final sentence of Proposi-
tion 5 was not preempted by IGRA because it was "consistent with and furthers the pur-
poses of IGRA").
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1008.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 994-95.
171. Id. at 994.
172. Id. at 995.
173. Id. at 1009.
174. Id. at 1008.
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gaming comply with state gambling laws. 175 The court noted only one
exception to that general rule-the portion of IGRA permitting Class
III gaming under tribal/state compacts.' 76
Thus, even IGRA's own language appears to limit its power to
exclude state law from regulating vice activities on state-dominion
land; IGRA itself establishes that state gambling laws may apply within
the preempted field of gaming on federal Indian lands unless the
state's regulatory scheme conflicts or interferes with a tribal-state com-
pact under IGRA. 177 Even then, according to IGRA's own language,
the parameters of gaming permitted by that compact must be compat-
ible with state law. A priori, state gambling laws must operate freely on
non-federal lands under state control. States should be able to author-
ize gaming on such lands by non-federal tribes, just as they could au-
thorize such gaming for any other party.
Salt River Pima-Maricapa Indian Community v. Hull1 78 further il-
luminates when the assertion of state authority in the Indian gaming
context does not conflict with, and therefore is not preempted by
IGRA. In Salt River, the court considered an Arizona proposition that
mandated the terms of a tribal gaming agreement irrespective of what
the Governor or Legislature might wish to negotiate. 79 Arizona's Gov-
ernor argued that the proposition was preempted by IGRA's specific
provisions regarding how compacts must be negotiated because the
Arizona proposition removed the Governor's IGRA-based authority to
negotiate the terms of such compacts and thus directly conflicted with
those provisions.' 80 The court found no such preemption, even
though the proposition clearly entered IGRA's preemptive field. 18'
The court upheld the proposition as compatible with IGRA because
the state could still negotiate compact terms; the proposition just set a
minimum for what the state could offer.1 82 The court stressed that the
purpose of IGRA is "to give Indian tribes a mechanism through which
to force a reluctant state government to the bargaining table and re-
quire it to negotiate a compact in good faith."18 3 Thus, even though
175. Id. at 1009.
176. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1166(c) (2000) (explaining the exception).
177. See Hotel Employees, 981 P.2d at 1009.
178. 945 P.2d 818 (Ariz. 1997).
179. Id. at 819-21.
180. Id. at 821.
181. Id. at 824.
182. Id. at 822.
183. Id. at 823 (quoting Wis. Winnebago Nation v. Thompson, 22 F.3d 719, 724 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
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the state gaming proposition fell within the preempted field, its pur-
pose was sufficiently consistent with IGRA to be upheld.
In light of Salt River, assuming, arguendo, that a state law author-
izing a state tribe to conduct gaming on state-dominion lands was
within IGRA's preemptive field, the state law would not be preempted
so long as it was compatible with IGRA's purpose: to balance state
interests in regulating gaming within state borders with federal inter-
ests in allowing federal tribes to operate casinos on federal Indian res-
ervations and support tribal economies.18 4 One way IGRA fulfills this
mission is by encouraging states to negotiate with tribes to create tri-
bal gaming compacts to regulate gaming within state borders.18 5 By
agreeing to enter into a gaming compact with a state tribe, however, a
state would already be at the bargaining table, and thus IGRA is un-
necessary to compel such negotiation.
Once again, this Article addresses the situation of a state and state
tribe that wish to engage in gaming, not a state attempting to stop an
Indian tribe from gaming-the latter of which IGRA was needed to
address.
State tribal gaming also comports with at least one other purpose
expressly stated in IGRA-"to provide a statutory basis for the opera-
tion of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal govern-
ments."186 By allowing state tribes to generate much needed revenue
through gaming agreements under state law, such tribes would be
able to further their economic development and self-sufficiency, and
thereby strengthen their governments. Ultimately, state interests in
supporting the economic development and self-sufficiency of a state
tribal government are consistent with Congress's interests in eco-
nomic development and tribal self-sufficiency in federal Indian
gaming.'8 7
184. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 998
(Cal. 1999).
185. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (2000) (establishing that tribes "having juris-
diction over the Indian lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or
is to be conducted, shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into
negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the con-
duct of gaming activities," and that "[u]pon receiving such a request, the State shall negoti-
ate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact").
186. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
187. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 100446, at 3 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3072-73 (noting the federal government's interests in fostering tribal gaming based on the
benefits that accrue to tribes).
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In Cabazon, the Supreme Court noted the Tribes' and federal gov-
ernment's interests in tribal economic development, emphasizing
their extreme importance: "The tribal games at present provide the
sole source of revenues for the operation of the tribal governments
and the provision of tribal services .... Self-determination and eco-
nomic development are not within reach if the Tribes cannot raise
revenues and provide employment for their members." 188 Similarly, in
Hotel Employees, the California Supreme Court emphasized IGRA's in-
terest in "promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments." 189
Here, it is also tribal self-sufficiency and economic development
that are at stake. Since a state compact with a state tribe apparently
parallels the purposes underlying IGRA, such agreements should not
be preempted, even if IGRA occupies the field.
Ultimately, gaming by a state tribe on a State Indian reservation
under state law could be carefully tailored to allow state-recognized
tribes the same economic development opportunities as those pro-
vided by IGRA for federal tribes operating casinos on federal "Indian
lands." The state laws might parallel IGRA's provisions, the games al-
lowed might parallel existing gaming at IGRA-licensed casinos, and
the agreements between states and their recognized tribes might par-
allel states' existing gaming compacts with federal tribes. Such gaming
could be strictly limited to state-recognized tribes on state-dominion
lands, including existing or newly created State Indian reservations.' 90
Thus, carefully tailored state law and state gaming compacts could be
made comparable to IGRA to avoid any conflicts with federal Indian
gaming regulation.
2. State Tribal Gaming Is Also Not Preempted by the Federal
Johnson Act
A second federal act that preempts some forms of tribal gaming is
the Johnson Act, which reads in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful
to ... sell, transport, possess, or use any gambling device ... within
Indian country as defined in section 1151 of Title 18 .... 191 The Act
188. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1987).
189. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 998 (Cal.
1999) (quoting 25 U.S.C. §2702(1) (1994)).
190. Tribal lands that may be considered State Indian reservations currently exist in
Alabama, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Ohio,
and Virginia. Koenig & Stein, supra note 144, at 2.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1175(a) (2000).
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makes several means of gambling, including the use of slot machines,
illegal in "Indian country."' 92
Ultimately, the definition of "Indian country" limits the preemp-
tive effect of the Johnson Act in the same manner that the definition
of "Indian lands" limits the preemptive effect of IGRA. The Johnson
Act does not apply to most state tribes because most state tribes' lands
are state-dominion lands that simply do not qualify as "Indian
country."
"Indian country" is a term of art defined by federal statute:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title,
the term "Indian country" . .. means (a) all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government . . . and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the In-
dian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-
of-way running through the same.193
First, under subsection (a), since state tribes' lands are not under
federal jurisdiction, their state reservations would not qualify as a res-
ervation under the jurisdiction of the United States government.
Second, under subsection (b), most state tribes' lands would not
qualify as "dependent Indian communit[ies] ." The United States Su-
preme Court, in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,194
explained that the term "'dependent Indian communit[y] "' "refers to
a limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor
allotments, and that satisfy two requirements-first, they must have
been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as
Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence."
19 5
In Venetie, a Tribe's original reservation had been revoked and there-
fore could not satisfy a federal set-aside requirement. 9 6 With revoca-
tion, federal superintendence over the land had been eliminated.'
9 7
Even the federal government providing the tribe with "'desperately
192. One exception to this general prohibition on gaming within Indian country is for
those tribes that have a valid compact under IGRA. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(6)(A)-(B).
Nevertheless, since IGRA does not apply to state tribes, if the Johnson Act applies, it would
present a barrier to a state-recognized tribe's Class III gaming efforts.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
194. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
195. Id. at 527.
196. Id. at 532.
197. Id. at 533.
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needed' social programs [could not] support a finding of Indian
country."198
In our case, where a state tribe would conduct gaming on a State
Indian reservation, a finding that the State Indian reservation quali-
fied as "Indian country" would be difficult. Most state tribes' tradi-
tional reservations have been revoked, and most existing lands would
not have been set aside by the federal government, as the tribes are
not federally-recognized. Instead, it is often the state government that
has recognized them and set aside their tribal lands. For example, if
the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe were to regain its tribal lands through
state legislation, such a State Indian reservation would not automati-
cally be subject to federal superintendence. The Gabrielino's reserva-
tion at San Sebastian was lost long ago and only that land would come
close to the requirement of "federal superintendence." 199 Thus, a new
State Indian reservation for the Gabrielinos would not qualify as a de-
pendent Indian community, or as "Indian country" under the John-
son Act.
Third, under subsection (c) above, most state tribes' lands would
not be "Indian allotments . . . titles to which have not been extin-
guished."200 An Indian allotment is land owned by an individual In-
dian that was parceled out of a larger federal reservation. 201 Most
allotments originated during the first half of the twentieth century fol-
lowing passage of the Indian General Allotment Act or "Dawes Act."20 2
The Act was part of a President Eisenhower's "assimilation policy" de-
signed to incorporate Indians into mainstream Western culture. 20 3
Tribal lands were broken up into a series of individual "allotments"
that were then issued to individual tribal members who could live on
or sell the land at will. 204 This program failed, however, because most
tribal members-many of whom were cash poor-sold their land to
non-Indians for small sums of money that were quickly spent, and the
Act never made the tribal members self-sufficient as was originally
198. Id. at 534.
199. Id.
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
201. See Internal Revenue Serv., Indian Tribal Governments: FAQs Regarding Termi-
nology, http://www.irs.gov/govt/tribes/article/O,,id=108431,00.html#A4 (last visited Aug.
12, 2004) [hereinafter IRS Website].
202. An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Vari-
ous Reservations (General Allotment or Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388-91 (1887) (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-381 (2000)).
203. See IRS Website, supra note 201.
204. See id.
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planned. 20 5 The Reorganization Act 20 6 was passed by Congress in 1934
to put an end to the allotment program.20 7 Since tribal title to most
allotments was extinguished during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, State Indian reservations would not fall within this
definition.
3. Preemption Argument Conclusion
Since both IGRA and the Johnson Act-the two primary federal
acts that regulate Indian gaming-do not apply to state tribes, it is
unlikely that the federal government has preempted the field of gam-
ing for all state tribes. General policy supports this argument. Origi-
nally, the conflict over whether tribes could conduct gaming was a
state/tribal issue, not a federal one. The main reason behind federal
gaming legislation was to encourage states and tribes to "get along."
Where a state seeks to foster Indian gaming by a state tribe, rather
than prohibit it by a federal tribe, such acts are not needed, and were
never intended to apply. Likewise, where gaming is permitted on
state-dominion lands rather than on federal Indian reservations, the
application of such acts is both unneeded and unintended.
CONCLUSION THREE: Gaming by state tribes, by other state-
authorized parties, and even by federally-recognized tribes that is not
conducted on federal "Indian lands" is not reached by IGRA or the
Johnson Act. Thus, gaming by a state tribe on state-dominion land,
such as a State Indian reservation, remains within the constitutional
purview of state authority. As a result, state-recognized tribes may con-
duct gaming activities where acceptable under state law.
D. Gaming by State-Recognized Tribes Does Not Violate Equal
Protection
After federal preemption, the most significant argument raised
by state tribal gaming opponents is that Class III gaming by state tribes
would violate equal protection. Opponents argue that giving state
tribes gaming rights through express compact between the state and
the tribe-rights not enjoyed by other state citizens or corporations-
would be an unlawful racial preference that violates the Fourteenth
205. See id.
206. Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984
(1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)).
207. See IRS Website, supra note 201.
TRIBAL GAMINGWinter 2006]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Amendment's guarantee that all be treated equally, and that no one
be denied "equal protection of the laws."2 °8
Analysis of federal precedents provides a strong counterargu-
ment. Today, most legislation benefiting federal tribes does not violate
equal protection. For example, IGRA and other federal statutes have
repeatedly withstood equal protection challenges even though they
benefit Native American tribes to the exclusion of other groups, be-
cause such discrimination is based upon a political classification, the
tribes' governmental status-not race.209 As shown below, the same
argument protects state laws that allow gaming by State Indian tribes
based upon their governmental status.
1. The Mancari Doctrine and Artichoke Joe's
Morton v. Mancari2 10 is the seminal authority that explains when
laws favoring American Indians do not violate equal protection. 211 In
Mancari, the Supreme Court held that a BIA hiring preference for
Indians did not violate equal protection because "[t] he preference, as
applied, [was] granted to Indians not as . .. discrete racial group [s],
but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities."212 The Court
reasoned that "[t]he preference is not directed towards a 'racial'
group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of
'federally-recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individu-
als who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the pref-
erence is political rather than racial in nature."213 With this statement,
a "political versus racial" distinction became the litmus test for
whether rational basis should be applied to tribal-friendly legislation,
or whether such legislation should be reviewed with strict scrutiny.214
If a rational basis test is applied, federal legislation helping federal
tribes is usually found to complement governmental objectives, and
easily found constitutional; conversely, if strict scrutiny is applied,
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Unverified Confidential Meeting with Bill Lockyer,
Cal. Attorney Gen., in Sacramento, Cal. (April 2004) (argument made by attorneys from
the California Department of Justice).
209. See infra Part II.D.1.
210. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
211. See, e.g., Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton (Artichoke Joe's II), 353 F.3d
712, 732 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing Mancari as the starting point for equal protection
analysis).
212. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 553 n.24.
214. Id. at 553-55.
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such legislation is usually found unconstitutional.21 5 Thus, parties in-
volved in applicable cases tend to battle over whether application of
strict scrutiny or a rational basis test is most appropriate.
The tribal gaming jurisprudence that built on Mancari has fol-
lowed the Mancari Court's approach. Mancari was applied by the
Ninth Circuit in 2003 in perhaps the most important equal protection
case addressing Indian gaming: Artichoke Joe's California Grand Casino v.
Norton216 ("Artichoke Joe's I'). In Artichoke Joe's II, plaintiff card rooms
and charities challenged the validity of the tribal gaming compacts
between California and a large number of federally-recognized Indian
tribes. 217 Plaintiffs argued that allowing only tribes to operate Las
Vegas style casinos to the exclusion of non-tribal casino operators vio-
lated the latter's equal protection rights under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments by creating an impermissible race-based
preference in favor of the tribes.218 The court applied Mancari to de-
termine whether the tribal compacts represented a race-based prefer-
ence, or one that was political.2 19 Based on Mancari, the court found
allowing tribal governments to have a monopoly on Class III gaming
was predicated on a political, not racial, designation and, therefore,
did not violate equal protection. 220
Ultimately, as declared in Artichoke Joe's II, a tribal gaming equal
protection analysis
requires ... answer[ing] two questions. First, [it must be decided]
whether the distinction between Indian and non-Indian gaming in-
terests is a political or a racial classification, so we can determine
the proper level of deference that is owed to the classification. Sec-
ond, [it must be decided] whether, under the applicable standard
of review, legitimate state interests justify the grant to Indian tribes
of a monopoly on class III gaming.22 1
As explained below, gaming by state-recognized tribes arguably satis-
fies both tests.
215. Artichoke Joe's II, 353 F.3d at 731-32 (noting rational basis review as "deferential,"
and referring back to Mancari as the starting point for analyzing when tribal preferences
should be subject to rational basis versus strict scrutiny).
216. Id. at 712, 732.
217. Id. at 714.
218. Id. at 731.
219. Id. at 732.
220. Id. at 742.
221. Id. at 731.
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2. Application of Mancari and Artichoke Joe's H to Gaming by State-
Recognized Tribes
a. The Distinction Between Gaming by State-Recognized Tribes
and Non-Indian Gaming Interests Represents a Political
Classification
State laws favoring gaming by state tribes should be subject to
rational basis review and not strict scrutiny, similar to laws favoring
federally-recognized tribes. State tribes, like their federal counter-
parts, are political entities and not racial groups. Similar to federal
recognition, state recognition "operates to exclude many individuals
who are racially to be classified as 'Indians' "-the Mancari test for
when a preference "is political rather than racial in nature."2 22 Like
federally-recognized tribes, state tribes must earn formal recognition
by an independent government entity: in this case, the state. Conse-
quently, not all self-defined, non-federally-recognized tribes would
qualify. In fact, most would not. Like federally-recognized tribes, state-
recognized tribes are subject to whatever screening criteria states
deem critical for recognizing a tribe. The only difference is that a state
government has recognized the tribe in lieu of the federal
government.
Opponents nonetheless will argue that the rational basis standard
advocated in Mancari was dependent not so much on the "political
versus racial" distinction, but on the fact of federal recognition. There is
support for that argument in Mancari "As long as the special treat-
ment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obli-
gation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be
disturbed. Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally de-
signed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Con-
gress' classification violates due process." 22 3
However, it is not clear that Congress's recognition was the pri-
mary determining line for the Mancari Court, which also stressed the
importance of distinguishing political entities from individual Native
Americans. 224 While the Court found that federally-recognized tribes
qualify as political entities for purposes of applying the less rigorous
rational basis scrutiny on the basis of Congress's recognition of their
government status,225 that does not necessarily mean that the "politi-
222. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
223. Id. at 555.
224. Id. at 553 n.24.
225. Id. at 554.
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cal versus racial" distinction cannot be applied to other Indian groups
to see if they might also qualify as political entities. This approach
makes sense in particular because equal protection jurisprudence gen-
erally operates to avoid impermissible "race-based" classifications, and
usually has little to do with "Congress' unique obligation [s] ."226
Opponents may also argue that because Mancari dealt only with a
subset of the tribal population-federally-recognized tribes227 -its
precedential value should be limited to that population. Nevertheless,
Mancari does not have to be interpreted so narrowly. As noted in
Arakaki v. Lingle,228 the Mancari Court "did not have before it any
question as to whether the [N] ative Americans being given the prefer-
ence were from federally recognized Indian tribes." 229 Consequently,
there was no reason to explicitly include state-recognized tribes-es-
pecially when state-recognized tribes are a minor, and often over-
looked, subset of the Native American tribal population.
Ultimately, Mancari states principles that reach beyond federally-
recognized tribes to address the nature of tribal sovereignty itself. For
example, the Mancari Court noted that a preference "reasonably...
related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal... is the principal char-
acteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial dis-
crimination." 230 This suggests the Court's concern was truly with racial
discrimination, and not with legislative attempts to limit participation
in a particular industry to federal tribes. Thus, it is difficult to imply
that the Court would use the strict scrutiny test only when faced with
federally-recognized tribes, but not state-recognized tribes. Both are
tribal sovereigns subjugated by the United States. Whether the United
States grants recognition or one of its federalist states grants recogni-
tion, a longstanding tribe is nonetheless a "quasi-sovereign entity" and
not just a racial group.
In applying the "political versus racial" analysis to the state-recog-
nized Gabrielino-Tongva or Shinnecock tribes, there is a strong argu-
ment that formal state recognition of the tribes is recognition of a
sovereign political community, not a specific racial group. Using the
Gabrielino-Tongva as an example, the relevant racial classification
would consist of a much larger group of individuals, such as "Mission
226. Id. at 555.
227. Id. at 553 n.24.
228. 305 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (D. Haw. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 423 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
1995).
229. Id. at 1168.
230. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added).
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Indians," "Shoshone Indians," or "Native Americans." These are classi-
fications that cross tribal government boundaries. In California, sev-
eral different tribes include members who can be classified as Mission
Indians, as Shoshone Indians, or as Native American. Just as Asian-
Americans of Japanese heritage (the racial and ethnic classifications)
can also be citizens of a particular state (the political or government
classification), Native Americans (the racial classification) may be citi-
zens of a particular tribe (the government classification). Similarly,
the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe excludes many Mission and Shoshone
Indians and certainly most Native Americans. The character of the
Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe is political as much because of its organiza-
tional attributes as a state-recognized sovereign, as its exclusion of
other members of the same racial group. All three of these factors
work in the same direction: the Tribe's external recognition by Cali-
fornia, the Tribe's internal organization as a tribal sovereign govern-
ment, and the Tribe's exclusivity independent of other members of
the same racial group, all strongly suggest the Gabrielino-Tongva
Tribe is not a racially determined entity, but one that is politically
defined.
While opponents argue that state recognition cannot stand in as a
relevant political classification because it is not as "formal" as federal
recognition (in part because criteria for state recognition vary dramat-
ically from state to state), even the federal government has recognized
that states have the authority to officially recognize tribes. By ex-
tending some federal benefits to state-recognized tribes on the basis of
their classification as state-recognized, the federal government has ar-
guably legitimized state recognition, and thereby validated state recog-
nition as a classification. Examples of federal regulations that extend
federal benefits to state tribes include Health and Human Services
Block Grants, 23 1 Administration of Food Stamp Programs on Indian
Reservations, 232 Energy Conservation Grant Programs, 233 and Native
American Welfare Programs.234 These regulations presumably with-
231. 45 C.F.R. § 96.44(a)-(b) (2004) (providing direct funding to Indian tribes, and
defining such tribes as including "organized groups of Indians that the state in which they
reside has determined are Indian tribes." Id. § 96.44(b)).
232. 7 C.F.R. § 281.2(a)(1) (recognizing as an "established reservation" those areas
"currently recognized and established by Federal or State treaty").
233. 10 C.F.R. § 455.2 (defining an eligible Indian tribe as "any tribe ... which ... is
located on, or in proximity to, a Federal or State reservation or rancheria").
234. 45 C.F.R. § 1336.10 (defining "Indian" as "a member or descendent of a member
of a North American tribe... who... [has] a special relationship with the United States or
a State through treaty, agreement or some other form of recognition" (emphasis
omitted)).
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stand equal protection scrutiny despite their inclusion of state-recog-
nized tribes, further suggesting federal recognition is not necessary
for tribal legislation to survive an equal protection analysis. Addition-
ally, while recognition by state governments may deliver less in the way
of concrete rights and obligations than federal recognition, state rec-
ognition can be every bit as solemn. The thirteen states that have rec-
ognized non-federal Indian tribes have used a variety of methods to
do so. These range from the passage ofjoint resolutions (as in Califor-
nia and Louisiana) to comprehensive statutory frameworks that grant
significant substantive rights (as in North Carolina).235
Finally, state tribal gaming opponents may try to argue that ra-
tional basis review can only be applied to ftderal laws that favor Indi-
ans, not to state laws that would be necessary to grant a preference to
state-recognized tribes to conduct gaming on a State Indian
reservation.236
In Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation,237 the Supreme Court provided the first step toward disarming
that argument, although the majority opinion limited the scope of its
decision. In Yakima, rational basis review was applied to a Washington
State law favoring federal Indian tribes; however, the court based its
application of rational basis review on the fact that a federal law (Pub-
lic Law 280) had authorized extending that state law into Indian
country.238
Even without the involvement of any federal authority, the politi-
cal classification argument should survive when applied to state law.
As established above, gaming is a vice activity subject to the state's
police power to regulate gaming within its sovereign borders. 239 As
noted in Artichoke Joe's I, under the state's police power, states have
235. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 71A-3 to 71A-7.2 (recognizing North Carolina's eight
state tribes); SJ. Res. 96, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. ch. 146 (Cal. 1994) (recognizing the Gabrie-
lino Tribe of Los Angeles); SJ. Res. 48, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. ch. 121 (Cal. 1993) (recogniz-
ing the Juaneno Band of Mission Indians in Orange County); see also generally Koenig &
Stein, supra note 144.
236. Most of the arguments in this Article assume such gaming is desired by both the
tribe and state. IGRA only requires states to negotiate gaming compacts with federally-
recognized tribes; neither it nor any other statute compels the state to negotiate such
agreements with state-recognized tribes or vice versa. We argue only that compacting over
tribal gaming should be an option available to state-recognized tribes and each state, not
that it is something that can, or should be, foisted on either sovereign.
237. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
238. Id. at 500-01.
239. See Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton (Artichoke Joe's H), 353 F.3d 712,
737 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The circuits that have given significant attention to equal protection
challenges to state gambling laws have, by and large, held that 'the regulation of gambling
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great leeway to grant monopolies without violating equal protection
considerations: "Where there exists an appropriate connection to the
state's police power, even the grant of a monopoly does not, in itself,
offend equal protection principles. ' 240 So long as state law grants this
monopoly to a politically classified group, such as a state tribe, and
not a racially classified group, such as all Native Americans, the Four-
teenth Amendment rational basis review standard should apply.
Holding otherwise, and denying rational basis review simply be-
cause there is no federal authority involved, takes an unnecessarily
narrow view of equal protection jurisprudence. Several preeminent
scholars in the field of Indian law have similarly suggested that a fed-
eral connection is not necessary to justify the application of rational
basis review. As argued by Felix S. Cohen,
[T] he Supreme Court held long ago that the federal relationship
with tribes does not preclude protective state laws which do not
infringe on federally protected rights . . . . If Indians are a legiti-
mate classification for protective federal laws, their status is argua-
bly the same for state laws of that character. Such state laws have
long been assumed valid.24 1
Ultimately, the only restriction on states appears to be that their
preferred classification (such as allowing Class III gaming by state-rec-
ognized tribes, and not the general population) be reasonable:
When the subject of legislation falls under the police powers of the
State, activities may be prohibited altogether, limited as to place
and location, or, where operation is permitted, may be regulated
by rules of conduct. These laws enacted under the police powers
must be subject to the restriction that the prohibition, limitation or
regulation, must apply to all alike who come within a reasonable
classification of persons or property. The fact that because of classi-
fication the statute does not apply to every person alike is no valid
objection to its constitutionality, for classification itself presupposes
inequality of application and the courts may only inquire if the
classification is reasonable and founded upon some logical, natu-
lies at the heart of the state's police power.'" (partially quoting Helton v. Hunt, 330 F.3d
242, 246 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003))).
240. Id. at 736-37.
241. FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 659 (Rem-
mard Strickland et al. eds., Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (1942). Carole Goldberg of UCLA
has also argued that state legislation can escape strict scrutiny so long as that legislation
carries forward established federal policies-in this case, such policies would be tribal eco-
nomic development and self-sufficiency. While "[h]elping isolated individuals, without any
perceptible group impact, will not suffice" she posits that equality based challenges to state
legislation can be surmounted so long as the state law "advance[s] group interests in self-
determination, encompassing the tribe's economic, cultural and political advancement."
Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REv. 943, 989
(2002).
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ral, intrinsic or constitutional distinction between people compos-
ing a class and others not embraced within it. 2 4 2
b. Legitimate State Interests Justify Granting Federal and State-
Recognized Tribes a Monopoly on Class III Gaming
Gaming by state-recognized tribes, on state-dominion land, under
state law, also passes the second half of the Fourteenth Amendment
analysis: whether legitimate state interests justify granting both state
and federal tribes a monopoly on Class III gaming. In Artichoke Joe's II,
after determining that rational basis review applied to the tribal-state
compacts, the court concluded the tribal gaming compacts survived
equal protection analysis because legitimate state interests were ra-
tionally related to granting a Class III gaming monopoly to Califor-
nia's federally-recognized tribes.243 The court found that the state had
two legitimate interests in granting the monopoly: (1) an interest in
regulating gaming as a vice activity and (2) promoting "cooperative
relationships between the tribes and the State by fostering tribal sover-
eignty and self-sufficiency." 244
Extending the Class III gaming monopoly to state tribes concords
with both interests. As for the first, state tribal gaming could be per-
mitted only under a tribal-state compact, similar or identical to gam-
ing compacts with federal tribes. Accordingly, the state would be able
to control the conditions under which such Class III gaming would be
conducted and thus would have a hand in regulating state tribal gam-
ing as a vice activity. As in Artichoke Joe's II, limiting Class III gaming to
a larger category that includes both federal and state tribes would con-
tinue to be rationally related to the stated regulatory interest in "fos-
ter[ing] California's 'legitimate [state] sovereign interest in
regulating the growth of Class III gaming activities in California"' and
"limiting Class III gaming operations ... to defend against ... crimi-
nal infiltration" 245
As for the second interest-promoting cooperation with tribal
sovereigns and fostering tribal self-sufficiency-extending the gaming
monopoly to state tribes similarly helps California enter "a 'new era of
242. People v. Sullivan, 141 P.2d 230, 232 (1943) (citations omitted) (citing, among
others, Plumley v. Massachussetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27
(1884); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878)).
243. Artichoke Joe's II, 353 F.3d at 736-42. The court did not consider whether this mo-
nopoly extended to state-recognized tribes. See generally id. The Gabrielino-Tongva tribe
argues that it does. See generally id.
244. Id. at 737.
245. Id. at ';40.
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tribal-state cooperation in areas of mutual concern.' " 246 State tribes,
like federal tribes, faced some of the most brutal episodes of geno-
cide, racism, and government-sponsored abuse in our Nation's his-
tory-episodes that obliterated many tribes and stripped the
government classification from many others.24 7 Recognizing the legiti-
macy of state tribes would help repair the same damage that was done
to federal tribes, by reaching those state-recognized tribal sovereigns
that, by a fluke of history, never gained federal acknowledgment. As
with federally-recognized tribes, allowing state sovereigns to conduct
Class III gaming operations would strengthen a "'mutually respectful
government-to-government relationship that will serve the mutual in-
terests of [the tribes and the state],' "248 by helping them build their
economic and political foundations.
Artichoke Joe's II even suggests-albeit indirectly-that gaming by
state-recognized tribes on a State Indian reservation under state law
could offer an even stronger case for allowing a Class III gaming mo-
nopoly, than in situations involving federally-recognized tribes. In
dicta, the Artichoke Joe's II opinion used the analogy of state subdivi-
sions to marshal its equal protection arguments:
Were the tribal lands a political subdivision of the State, Califor-
nia's exemption of tribal lands from its state-wide prohibition on
class III gaming activities easily would withstand constitutional scru-
tiny. When enacting substantive regulations or prohibitions of vice
activities, the interests implicated lie "at the heart of the state's po-
lice power." . . . With regard to these activities, a state is free to
enact legislation that accords different treatment to different local-
ities, and even to different establishments within the same locality,
so long as that differentiation is tied to a legitimate interest in the
health, safety, or welfare of its citizens. The state may make such
distinctions by local-option laws, or by making the distinction be-
tween different areas itself. It may impose more stringent regula-
tions by way of local restrictions, or it may exempt an area
entirely .... Unless such legislative distinctions infringe fundamen-
tal rights or involve suspect classifications, they generally survive
equal protection analysis. 2 49
In the case of state tribes, a state-created Indian reservation would ar-
guably be a political subdivision of the state and fall squarely within
246. Id. at 741.
247. See, e.g., FivE ViEws, supra note 17 (discussing the abuses suffered by California's
Indian tribes, several of which are still not federally recognized).
248. Artichoke Joe's II, 353 F.3d at 741 (citing Tribal-State Compact § 1.0(a)).
249. Id. at 740 (citations omitted); see also People v. Sullivan, 141 P.2d 230, 232 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1943) (noting that the states have significant leeway to favor certain groups when
legislating with respect to a state police power, such as gaming; the primary limit is that the
favored group's classification be "reasonable").
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the argument. Consequently, the state would have enormous power to
permit Class III gaming on a State Indian reservation to the exclusion
of other locales.
Finally, extending the monopoly on Class III gaming from federal
tribes to federal and state tribes coincides with the general gaming
policies of several states that allow exceptions to their anti-casino poli-
cies when proceeds benefit government or non-profit purposes, fulfil-
ling a legitimate state interest in providing funding for such
entities.2 50 For example, California's constitution has long provided
exceptions to its anti-gaming provisions by permitting a state lottery to
generate income for the state government. 25' Permitting Class III
gaming by California's state-recognized tribes would go a long way to-
ward providing for tribal government coffers, just as the California
lottery does for the state.
CONCLUSION FOUR: Gaming by state-recognized tribes does
not violate equal protection laws that forbid state governments from
discriminating in favor of one racial group, because state tribes are
political groups, and not racially-defined entities.
E. Significant Policy Arguments Support Gaming by State-
Recognized Tribes
Finally, just as with federal tribal government gaming, numerous
policy arguments support recognizing Class III gaming rights for state-
recognized tribes. These arguments include generating jobs and reve-
nue for tribal governments and thereby fostering self-sufficiency, rais-
ing revenue for and increasing economic activity in surrounding
communities, supporting the most documented of the nation's non-
federally-recognized tribes while they wait out the often protracted
federal recognition process, and upholding the sovereign rights of
both states and the tribes they recognize.
1. Proceeds from Tribal Gaming Benefit States and Tribes by
Generating Jobs and Revenue
As with federal tribal gaming, state tribal gaming has the poten-
tial to provide tremendous social and economic benefits for tribal gov-
ernments, local communities, and states. Gaming by federally-
recognized tribes "has generated thousands of jobs; created a market
250. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19, cl. c (permitting bingo for charitable purposes); CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 19, cl. d (authorizing establishment of a California State Lottery).
251. See CONST. art. IV, § 19, cl. d.
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for local suppliers; raised revenue to benefit local charities; helped
remove members of both gaming and non-gaming tribes from welfare
rolls; generated millions of dollars in state and federal taxes; provided
schools for tribal youth; and reinvested in local communities."252 Ac-
cording to the 2004 Report on Indian Gaming written by Alan Meister
("MEISTER REPORT"), the impact of tribal gaming on the national
economy has been significant, contributing 460,000jobs, $16.3 billion
in wages, $42.7 billion in output, and $5.3 billion in tax revenue. 253
Through revenue sharing programs, approximately $759 million has
been forwarded to the states.254 The even more recent Analysis of the
Economic Impact of Indian Gaming in 2004, published in 2005 by the
National Indian Gaming Association, suggests that those benefits are
growing: total revenues generated by Indian gaming have jumped to a
staggering $18.5 billion.2 55 More than half a million jobs have been
created by tribal gaming and ancillary businesses, reducing federal
government unemployment benefits and welfare payments by $1.4 bil-
lion.256 More than $100 million has been generated for local busi-
nesses, as well as $1.8 billion in state government revenue, and $5.5
billion in federal taxes. 257
Gaming by state-recognized tribes would only add to these
figures. A recent economic report estimates that 47,200jobs would be
created by the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe's Tongva Casino & Resort,
and over $4.2 billion in new economic activity would be generated in
Los Angeles County, including $3 billion from increased tourism.2 58
This new economic activity, and the Tribe's offer to share 20% of their
net gaming revenue, is estimated to generate as much as $648 million
annually for federal, state, county, and local government in the first
year alone.259 These financial contributions and the Tribe's legal, his-
torical, and equitable arguments have generated support from a di-
252. Koenig, Gambling, supra note 7, at 1065.
253. Abrahms, supra note 3, at Al (quoting THE ANALYSIS GROUP, THE POTENTIAL Eco-
NOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED GABRIELINO CASINO RESORT ON Los ANGELES
(2005), available at http://www.tongvatribe.org/EmpiricalStudies/LACountyfullstudy-
final_7_6_05.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2005)).
254. See Abrahms, supra note 3, at Al.
255. NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, supra note 3, at 2.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. THE ANALYSIS GROUP, THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACT OF THE PRO-
POSED GABRIELINO CASINO RESORT ON Los ANGELES 5 (2005), available at http://www.
tongvatribe.org/EmpiricalStudies/LACounty-full-study-final-7-6-05.pdf (last visited
Nov. 10, 2005).
259. See id.
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verse coalition of business, labor, and minority groups interested in
improving the Los Angeles County economy, and especially its tourist
industry. 260
2. State Recognition Is a Viable Alternative to the Unwieldy
Federal Recognition Process
The creation of state tribal casinos would also enable state-recog-
nized tribes-those which arguably have the strongest cases for fed-
eral recognition-to strengthen their economies and provide valuable
services for their tribal members while they await federal recognition.
Securing federal recognition is not a simple alternative for tribes.
While there are three possible paths to obtaining such recognition,
they are time consuming, difficult, and often enormously expensive to
navigate-if they work at all. For many tribes, any chance of federal
recognition is decades away-decades during which tribal casinos
could do significant good for the tribal government and surrounding
communities, 261 and decades during which their inherent rights as
sovereign tribes have been put on pause.
The first option for tribes attempting to become federally-recog-
nized is to try to gain recognition through the federal legislative pro-
260. The significant economic and social benefits that can be generated from urban
gaming are evident in Michigan, where Proposition E (a 1996 referendum that authorized
the creation of three Class III casinos in Detroit, an historically black city with a high pov-
erty rate) helped revitalize the local economy. For information on the history of Proposi-
tion E, see, for example, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 276 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 2002). See also Michigan Gaming
Control and Revenue Act, MICH. COMP. LAws § 432.201-.226 (1997) (interpreting and ex-
panding upon Proposition E).
261. See Koenig, Gambling, supra note 7, at 1065 ("Tribal gaming has generated
thousands of jobs; created a market for local suppliers; raised revenue to benefit local
charities; helped remove members of both gaming and non-gaming tribes from welfare
rolls; generated millions of dollars in state and federal taxes; provided schools for tribal
youth; and reinvested in local communities" (internal citations omitted)); Cal. Nations
Indian Gaming Ass'n, Answers to Common Questions About Tribal Gaming, http://www.
cniga.com/facts/qanda.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2005); Cal. Nations Indian Gaming Ass'n,
Research Articles: Economic and Fiscal Benefits of Tribal Gaming (July 1, 1998), http://
www.cniga.com/facts/research-detail.php?id=8 (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). For an over-
view of the harms implicit in all forms of gaming, tribal and otherwise, see Ben Schnayer-
son, As Gaming Industry Grows, Experts See Rise in Gambling Addicts, SUN (San Bernadino
County), Dec. 31, 2003, at Al (noting that tribal casinos have established more opportuni-
ties for gambling addicts to gamble). While tribal gaming opponents also assert that tribal
casinos bring an influx of crime to surrounding communities, that argument has been
largely discredited.
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cess. This is so difficult to achieve, however, that Congress has granted
recognition to only two California Indian tribes in the last ten years. 2 62
The second route is for tribes to secure recognition through the
executive process, as represented by the BIA and its formal acknowl-
edgement process set forth in 25 C.F.R. § 83.263 Despite being the
most common method of attempting to gain recognition, this route
may be the most time consuming. The BIA's process involves a num-
ber of steps: each tribe must first file a letter of intent requesting fed-
eral recognition and noting the tribe's intent to submit a documented
petition. 264 Second, the tribe must submit the documented peti-
tion,265 and third, the tribe must present evidence that demonstrates
it can meet the mandatory criteria laid out in 25 C.F.R. § 83.7.266
The Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe has filed several letters of intent,
reserving Petition Nos. 140, 140a, 176, and 201, to begin the recogni-
tion process. 267 Because the BIA operates very slowly, 268 the BIA is not
expected to consider No. 140-the Tribe's first shot at recognition-
for more than a decade. 269 The Shinnecock Tribe first filed for recog-
nition in the 1970s; their petition has similarly languished without res-
olution for years.2 70 The process has proven so unwieldy, that even the
man who created it in 1978 calls it a "monster," admitting that "the
standards got to be impossible."27 1
262. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1300m-1 (2000) (granting federal recognition to the Paskenta
Band of Nomlaki Indians in 1994); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1300n-2 (granting federal recogni-
tion to the Federated Indians of Graton Rancheria in 2000). Two other tribes, the lone
Band of Miwok Indians and the Lower Lake Tribe, had their recognition clarified adminis-
tratively. Confidential Unverified E-mail from Cindy Darcy, Senate Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs, to Alexa Koenig, Assistant Professor, Univ. of S.F. Sch. of Law (Aug. 1, 2005) (on
file with author).
263. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2004).
264. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.4(a).
265. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.5(e).
266. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7.
267. See 500 Nations, supra note 51 (providing a list of federal recognition petitions for
all tribes currently involved in the federal recognition process, including the Gabrielino-
Tongva).
268. See, e.g., Bureau of Indian Affairs Tribal Recognition Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Government Reform,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Barry T. Hill, Director, Natural Resources and Environ-
ment), available at 2002 WL 193645 (F.D.C.H.) (noting it could take more than fifteen
years to resolve all currently completed petitions).
269. See Indianz.com, Big Workload Looms for BIA on Federal Recognition, http://
www.Indianz.com/News/2005/009485.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) (noting that several of
the tribes listed on the federal government's "ready for consideration" list have been wait-
ing nearly a decade for a determination of their status).
270. See Shinnecock Indian Nation History, supra note 54.
271. Magagnini, supra note 9, at Al.
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The third option is to try to secure recognition judicially. This
route is neither easy nor routine. One type of judicial recognition is
"federal common law" recognition. Courts have declared many state-
recognized tribes, including the Gabrielino-Tongva, 272 federal com-
mon law tribes. These are defined as "a body of Indians of the same or
a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or govern-
ment, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined terri-
tory."27 3 Federal common law recognition means that the tribe is
recognized as a sovereign tribal entity for limited purposes,27 4 such as
whether a particular court has jurisdiction over the tribe. Neverthe-
less, federal common law tribes have not traditionally received the full
range of benefits that accrue with formal recognition by the BIA, in-
cluding the right to conduct Class III gaming under federal law.275
While federal common law tribal status provides yet another indica-
tion of the strong evidence supporting a tribe's fight for federal recog-
nition and another sign of a tribe's government structure, such
recognition falls far short of the measures needed to foster self-
sufficiency.
An innovative case recently offered the possibility of expanding
the role of judicial recognition. As noted above, in New York v. Shin-
necock Indian Nation,276 Judge Platt stayed a case that had been
brought to enjoin the state-recognized Shinnecock Tribe from build-
ing a tribal casino, pending the BIA's determination of the Tribe's
federal status. After the BIA admitted that it could not meet the
court's eighteen-month deadline, and in recognition of the more than
twenty-five years the Tribe has already waited for federal recognition,
the court joined the United States as an "involuntary plaintiff' and
declared it might determine itself whether the Tribe had to be "ac-
272. Dunlap v. Morales, No. BC-280605 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Sept. 22, 2003)
(ruling by the Los Angeles Superior Court finding the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe a federal
common law tribe).
273. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
274. See, e.g., Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Mont., Inc., 68 P.3d 814
(Mont. 2003). In Koke, Montana's Supreme Court applied the test for federal common law
recognition to determine whether a non-federally-recognized tribe was sovereign: if yes,
then Montana's state courts would have no authority to adjudicate the case's underlying
issues. Id at 816-18. The Koke court distinguished between the two types of recognition:
"Although [the tribe] has not yet received federal recognition, tribes may still be recog-
nized as such under common law." Id at 816. There, the tribe was ultimately recognized as
a federal common law sovereign, even though it was not recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior as a tribe for the purpose of receiving federal recognition benefits. See id. at 817.
275. See Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266; see also 25 C.F.R. § 83.12 (2004) (explaining the rights
and responsibilities that attend formal recognition).
276. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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knowledged" as meeting the requirements for formal federal recogni-
tion.2 77 In May 2005, however, the government's motion to be
dismissed as a party was granted by the court.2 78 Consequently, this
path to federal recognition remains untested; even if Judge Platt had
taken it upon himself to recognize the Tribe through the judiciary,
such an act would have been challenged; those unhappy with the deci-
sion would have argued that the court exceeded its powers and
usurped the right of the executive branch to acknowledge Indian
tribes. The separation of powers argument and the normal appellate
process would have prevented resolution for quite some time.279
3. Gaming by State-Recognized Tribes Respects State and Tribal
Sovereignty
Finally, permitting states and state-recognized tribes to enter into
gaming agreements would honor both state and tribal sovereignty,
concordant with modern notions of federalism as well as the time-
honored federal policy favoring tribal independence. Congress's ex-
press purpose for regulating the tribal gaming industry has been to
promote "tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments. '" 280 As asserted in IGRA's legislative history, "for
those tribes that have entered into the business of [gaming], the in-
come often means the difference between an adequate governmental
program and a skeletal program that is totally dependent on Federal
277. See Ann Givens, Shinnecock Case Could Set National Precedent, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2004,
at A08, available at http://www.shinnecocknation.com/news/news74.aspx (last visited Mar.
22, 2004) (discussing the potential role of the judiciary in the federal recognition process
of the Shinnecock Tribe); see also Michael Colello, Shinnecock Casino Trial Begins in Spring,
INDEPENDENT (East Hampton), Jan. 27, 2004, http://www.shinnecocknation.com/news/
news75.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) (noting a trial to decide whether the tribe should be
granted federal recognition status was likely to start in April 2004). As of June 2005, a
determination of the Tribe's federal status was still unresolved. See generally Shinnecock
Indian Nation, Home Page, http://www.shinnecocknation.com (last visited June 13,
2005).
278. See Case Docket, New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 2:03-cv-03243).
279. In November 2005, as this Article was going to print, Judge Platt took the ground-
breaking and controversial step of declaring the Shinnecock Indian Nation a tribe for gam-
ing purposes, calling on the Tribe's centuries of documented relationships with the State
of New York and the federal government, and the Shinnecock's status as a tribe under the
Montoya federal common law standard. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F.
Supp. 2d 486 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). While this ruling will certainly be contested, Judge Platt's
decision adds ammunition to the argument that the BIA's federal recognition process is
unwieldy, unworkable, and unfair, and suggests it may be the responsibility of the courts to
step in and acknowledge state-recognized tribes as bona fide tribes for gaming purposes.
280. Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton (Artichoke Joe's I), 353 F.3d 712, 715
(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1), (2) (2000)).
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funding. '281 The recognition of gaming rights in federally-recognized
tribes has meant increased autonomy for hundreds of tribal govern-
ments. It is time for a greater recognition of state authority to recog-
nize tribes, and to allow that authority to address local conditions.
Self-sufficiency should be within reach of not only federally-recog-
nized tribes, but also those few that have earned the respect and rec-
ognition of the states.
CONCLUSION FIVE: Significant policy arguments, consistent
with IGRA policies to support the economic well-being of federal
tribes, also support gaming by state-recognized tribes under state law.
Conclusion
Ultimately, in our federalist system, state tribes and the states that
recognize them should have the right to decide whether to allow gam-
ing activities on state-dominion land, including State Indian reserva-
tions, under state law. This proposition is supported by firm legal
precedents: as established above, states have the power to regulate
most forms of gaming within their borders, including gaming by non-
federally recognized tribes on state dominion lands. This authority
has not been expressly preempted by the Federal government and re-
mains a state right under the United States Constitution's Tenth
Amendment. Additionally, such a practice would not violate equal
protection mandates.
In addition to having a strong legal foundation, gaming by state-
recognized tribes is also supported by powerful policy considera-
tions-similar considerations to those that underlie gaming by feder-
ally-recognized tribes. Recognizing state and tribal authority to reach
an agreement without the sanction of federal involvement would en-
able state governments and the tribes they recognize to generate reve-
nue for economic stability and diversification. State power, as
originally envisioned by the federalist system, would be revived. Addi-
tionally, recognizing the validity of state tribal gaming concords with
Congress's goal of promoting stronger tribal governments and in-
creased tribal self-sufficiency. By recognizing that states have the right
to authorize state tribal gaming to bonafide tribes within their borders,
important notions of federalism and sovereignty will be advanced, en-
suring our nation's most disregarded tribal governments are no
longer lost in the shuffle.
281. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 2-3 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3072
(additional views of Senator John McCain, as indicated in the background of S. REP. No.
100-446).
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